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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the advent of democracy, one of the most serious economic problems facing the South 
African economy is the persistently high unemployment. Although employment has been 
increasing in general since the economic transition, the extent of such increase is not rapid 
enough to absorb the expanding labour force entrants, thereby causing both the level and rate 
of unemployment to increase. This is indicated by the fact that, despite the increase of 
employment number from 9.5 million in 1995 to 15.2 million in 2014, the number of 
unemployed increased from 2.0 million to 5.2 million during the same period, thereby causing 
the unemployment rate to rise from 17.6% to 25.4%. In fact, the labour market objective of 
the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) to reduce the 
unemployment rate to 15% by the end of 2014 is not achieved. 
 
The government has been trying to solve the unemployment problem by means of various 
policies, ranging from the “big” policies like the Reconstruction and Development Program 
(RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR), the aforementioned 
ASGISA, and the recently launched National Development Plan (NDP), to the more specific 
labour market policies such as the Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP), promotion of 
small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) to the implementation of the Employment 
Tax Incentives Bill (also known as the Youth Wage Subsidy) since 1 January 2014. 
 
This study first provides a theoretical framework on various models of unemployment, before 
the main causes of unemployment in South Africa are discussed. A critical evaluation of the 
pros and cons of various policy options to alleviate unemployment would be looked at. Some 
of the policy options have already been implemented in South Africa for years and hence the 
possible success of these policies would be investigated in detail. Few policies have only been 
recently implemented (e.g. the Employment Tax Incentives Bill), while other possible policy 
options have not yet been implemented in South Africa (e.g. job-seeking transport subsidy) 
but have been adopted in other countries. Hence, the feasibility of these options for South 
Africa would be investigated, by examining the outcome of these policies in the other 
countries. 
 
KEYWORDS: Unemployment, labour market policy, job creation, skills mismatch, 
structural change, South Africa 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Statement of problem 
 
It has been more than 20 years since the demise of apartheid in 1994, yet unemployment 
remains persistently high in South Africa. Since 1995, the economy has been showing some 
signs of growth and one would have expected unemployment to decline continuously. 
Although the South African economy has been showing moderate, positive growth in the past 
20 years, employment growth remains relatively slow. Alternatively, it can be said that 
employment growth is not rapid enough to absorb the new labour force entrants, thereby 
causing unemployment to go up and remain persistently high. 
 
Being unemployed means that a family has less income for consumption and savings. The 
consequences of unemployment are bad for a country. Families are in poorer health and their 
children’s academic performances are usually worse than those who are unemployed (Nichols 
et al., 2013). Other consequences of unemployment include poor self-esteem, worsening 
poverty and inequality, as well as social problems such as crime, erosion of human capital, 
social instability, poor nutrition and poor social network (Dollard and Winefield, 2002; 
Kingdon and Knight, 2004). This also affects the way the international economies perceive 
South Africa. 
 
Despite government’s efforts with the implementation of various ‘big’ strategies (such as the 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR), Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASIGSA), National 
Development Plan (NDP)) and micro-level labour market policies (e.g. promotion of Small, 
Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs); regional development), along with the post-
apartheid legislations such as Affirmative Action, Labour Relations Act (LRA), Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) and the recently launched Employment Tax 
Incentives Bill (ETIB) to achieve, amongst others, rapid job creation and greater demand for 
youth workers, unemployment of the country remains persistently high. Some of these 
policies worked well in other countries but somehow in South Africa they do not seem to 
work well. Also, some countries have introduced a transport subsidy policy but, as with many 
other policies, this policy has not been implemented in South Africa yet. The Basic Income 
Grant (BIG) was also a considered as a policy option but was abolished and not implemented. 
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1.2 Objectives of the study 
 
The research questions of the proposed study are as follows: 
 Are the past and current labour market strategies being successful in alleviating 
unemployment, if not generating jobs more rapidly to absorb the labour force entrants? 
 To assess the different unemployment policies in different countries and evaluate their 
successes or failures. 
 Are there alternative policy options available to reduce unemployment that have not yet 
been implemented in South Africa (but they might have been implemented in other 
countries), and how feasible are these alternative policies? 
 
1.3 Outline of the study 
 
This study will consist of six chapters. Chapter One has discussed the statement of the 
problem and objectives of the study. Chapter Two presents a literature review of the 
conceptual framework, theoretical framework as well as main causes of unemployment in 
South Africa. Chapter Three discusses the methodology and data, before Chapter Four 
provides a descriptive analysis on the extent and trends of unemployment in South Africa in 
1995-2014. The demographic, educational attainment and past work experience 
characteristics of the unemployed will be looked at. Chapter Five will critically evaluate the 
success (if any) of the current labour market policies, before examining the feasibility of 
alternative policy options that have not yet been implemented in South Africa but have been 
adopted in other countries. Chapter Six concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter consists of main parts, namely conceptual framework, theoretical framework and 
main causes of unemployment. The conceptual framework (Section 2.2) first explains how 
labour market status is derived (to pave the way for the forthcoming empirical analysis of the 
labour survey data), the various types of employment, the differences between active and 
passive labour market policies, as well as the legislative framework in South Africa with 
regard to the labour market; the theoretical framework (Section 2.3) discusses numerous 
theoretical models in connection with unemployment. Finally, Section 2.4 highlights the main 
causes of unemployment in South Africa, ranging from rigidities in the labour market and 
labour market discrimination to barriers of entry to informal sector and high reservation wage. 
 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
 
2.2.1 Derivation of labour market status 
The working-age population are defined as those aged 15 to 65 years. For those who are 
neither employed nor unemployed, they are defined as inactive. Alternatively, it could be said 
that those who are either employed or unemployed are part of the labour force (LF) or 
economically active population. As far as the employed are concerned, according to the 
labour market status derivation methodology of Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), as long as 
someone has worked for at least one hour in the past seven days, he/she would be 
immediately defined as employed. 
 
The unemployed refers to those in the working-age population who were not employed during 
the reference week; actively looked for work or started a business in the four weeks before the 
interview; were available for work or started a business in the reference work; had a job or 
business to start in the future and were available. 
 
In contrast, the discouraged work seekers are those who were not employed during the 
reference period but wanted to work and were available to work or start a business but did not 
look for work actively or start a business during the last four weeks. The reasons why they are 
not looking for work or starting a business are because there are no jobs available in the area, 
they are unable to find jobs that match their skills or they lost hope in finding work. Note that 
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discouraged work seekers are excluded under the narrow definition of labour market status, to 
be discussed below. 
 
Two standard definitions of unemployment are adopted by Stats SA, namely the narrow 
definition and broad definition of unemployment. Individuals were generally defined as 
narrowly unemployed if they: (a) did not work during the seven days prior to the interview, 
(b) wanted to work and would accept a job if being offered one (there was an additional 
requirement since LFS 2000b that these people must be available to start work within two 
weeks of the interview), and (c) had taken active steps to look for work or to start a business 
in the four weeks prior to the interview. Those who only met the first two requirements above 
were defined as discouraged work seekers, and are classified as inactive under the narrow 
definition but unemployed under the broad definition (see Table 2.1). Discouraged work 
seekers are also excluded when the labour force participation rate (LFPR) is derived. 
 
Table 2.1: Derivation of labour force participation rates and unemployment rates 
Labour market status 
(1) Employed 
(2) Unemployed 
(3) Discouraged job seeker 
(4) Inactive 
Narrow labour force participation rate  
= Labour force / Working-age population=
)4()3()2()1(
)2()1(


 
Broad labour force participation rate  
= Labour force / Working-age population=
)4()3()2()1(
)3()2()1(


 
Narrow unemployment rate  
= Unemployed / Labour force=
)2()1(
)2(

 
Broad unemployment rate  
= Unemployed / Labour force=
)3()2()1(
)3()2(


 
 
2.2.2 Types of unemployment 
(A) Seasonal Unemployment 
Seasonal unemployment occurs when people are unemployed during certain times of the year, 
because they work in industries where they are not needed the whole year (Mourdoukoutas, 
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1988). In other words, there is a limited need for the type of work to be performed during a 
particular period during the year.  According to Mourdoukoutas (1988) the fluctuations can be 
regularly anticipated and follow a systematic pattern over the course of the year. Examples of 
this type of unemployment can be found in agriculture, the fishing industry, lifeguarding etc. 
 
(B) Frictional Unemployment 
Frictional unemployment occurs during the time period when people are searching for another 
job (Barker, 2007:186). These employees move from one job to another due to better 
opportunities elsewhere, for instance. 
 
Barker (2007:186) is of the opinion that there will always be new entrants to the labour 
market and existing employees leaving the labour market. Since the information about new 
employers and employees is imperfect, it takes time for employees to find work and 
employers to find new employees. This gives rise to frictional unemployment and this 
explains why full employment cannot be reached.  
 
(C) Cyclical or Demand Deficient Unemployment 
Cyclical unemployment is associated with fluctuations in the business activity (Barker, 2007). 
A decline in aggregate demand in the output market will result in a decrease in the demand 
for labour. According to Barker (2007) this type of unemployment is normally experienced 
during economic recession.  
 
(D) Structural Unemployment 
Structural unemployment refers to the overall inability of the economy to provide 
employment due to structural imbalances (Barker, 2007:186-187). This type of 
unemployment could occur even if the economy flourishes. During economic upswing, this 
type of unemployment takes place because employment cannot adjust rapid enough to the 
prosperity of the economy. 
 
Some of the reasons why this occurs according to Barker (2007), include the rapid growth of 
the labour force, the use of capital- or skills-incentive technology, and an inflexible labour 
market. This type of unemployment arises when there is a mismatch between the skills 
demanded and supplied in a given area or an imbalance between the supply of and demand for 
workers across the areas. Mismatches occur because the demand for one kind of labour falls 
while the demand for another is rising but supplies do not adjust quickly. This, according to 
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Chadha (1994), is the most serious type of unemployment in South Africa. According to 
Barker (2007), the South African labour market is characterised by a small percentage of 
skilled workers and a large proportion of unskilled workers. The demand for skilled workers 
exceed the supply of skilled workers while the supply of unskilled workers exceeds the 
demand for unskilled workers and since unemployment in South Africa is concentrated on the 
unskilled workforce, this gives rise to higher unemployment. 
 
The determinants of structural unemployment are numerous. Dornbusch and Fisher (1992) are 
of the opinion that structural unemployment relates to the nature of the labour market as well 
as the composition of aggregate demand. It is difficult for a work seeker to find work even if 
the person is willing to work for a lower wage because of the complexity of the labour 
market. On the other hand, Ehrenberg and Smith (1982) argue that one of the biggest 
determinants to structural unemployment is the technological change where labour is 
substituted with capital. There are a number of reasons for this, such as trade union pressure 
for higher wages, technological development, a structural decrease in economic growth, 
unemployment benefits. 
 
2.2.3 Labour market policy 
Labour market policies refer to measures that directly affect the operations and results of 
labour markets so as to maximise quality employment and minimise unemployment and 
underemployment (ILO, 1993). Active labour market policies can be distinguished from 
passive labour market policies, to be discussed below. 
 
(A) Passive labour market policies 
Passive labour market policies help with labour market integration. These policies attempt to 
replace labour income (ILO, 2010). According to the ILO (2010) passive labour market 
policies can also be regarded as generosity policies. These policies refer to income support for 
the period without work, respectively to unemployment benefits granted to workers. They can 
also be early retirement schemes. In addition, according to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), 
passive labour market policies reduce the cost of unemployment and raise the wages of 
labour. They argue that there is less job creation and more job destruction. 
 
In South Africa, there are two such policies that are pertinent in the eradication of 
unemployment. They are the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and the Basic Income 
Grant (BIG). First, UIF stands for the incentives for employees to engage in temporary layoffs 
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are also affected by the UIF. This is financed by a payroll tax. The UIF is paid by employers 
and employees. The UIF is funded from a payroll of one percent on employers plus a levy of 
one percent on the employee’s income. An unemployed worker who has contributed to the 
UIF is entitled to a benefit that varies according to income, from 38% of the previous 
remuneration for highly paid workers to 58% for the lowest paid workers (Strydom, 2001).  
 
As far as the BIG is concerned, the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive System of 
Social Security (the Taylor Committee 2002) recommended the introduction of the BIG to 
alleviate absolute levels of poverty. The Committee argues that at least 22 million people in 
South Africa fall below the poverty line. On average, they survive on less than R144 per 
month. Many of the country’s poorest households fall through the security net because they 
do not receive UIF, or qualify for a state old age pension, a disability grant or a child 
maintenance grant. However, the BIG was eventually not implemented at the end, due to 
various reasons, amongst others, that the BIG could lead to a reduction of labour supply (i.e. 
leisure could be preferred over work upon the receipt of the grant income) as everyone is 
guaranteed some non-labour income. 
 
(B) Active labour market policies 
Active labour market policies aim to improve the operation and results of labour markets so 
as to maximise quality employment and minimise unemployment and underemployment 
(ILO, 1993). Active labour market policies try to prevent unemployment or remedy it by 
returning displaced workers to productive jobs. They are policies that aim to improve the 
operation and results of labour markets and include policies to enrich labour supply, enhance 
the demand for labour and improve labour market processes (ILO, 1993). 
 
According to Barker (2007), active labour market policies are especially introduced at 
community level such as households, environment, culture, infrastructure and social care. In 
South Africa’s case, these policies focus on making employment for young people more 
attractive (Barker, 2007). On the other hand, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
classifies the active labour market policies under three main headings (ILO, 1993) such as: 
strategies that must be introduced to improve the quantity and quality of labour supply, to 
change the structure of the labour market, the development of labour market institutions and 
processes. 
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Active labour market policies can be sub-divided into demand-side labour market policies and 
supply-side labour market policies, to be discussed below. 
 
Demand-side labour market policies 
Snower (1997) distinguishes two types of demand management policies as: government 
employment policies where government hires people to work in the public sector; and product 
demand policies where employment is stimulated by increasing aggregate product demand 
through tax deductions and increase in government spending or money supply. 
 
Hiring people to work in the public sector will contribute towards the alleviation of 
unemployment. However this may result in a big increase of the public sector and government 
spending. This will in turn result in increased taxation to fund these programmes. The other 
point that Snower (1997) makes, may result in increased inflation.   
 
The South African government has implemented some demand side policy instrument in 
addressing the unemployment rate. They do that by subsidising training programs for the 
unemployed. Oosthuizen and Cassim (2014) point out a few programs where the South 
African government attempt to train the unemployed to acquire jobs. For instance, the Public 
deployment program (through the National Youth Agency (NYDA)) aims to train the 
unemployed and unskilled. It is a 12-month training programme where candidates are trained 
in the field of construction and or enterprise development where labour demand was greater. 
 
Another example of demand-side policies is the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
which was introduced in 2004 (EPWP Unit, 2004), Evans-Klock et al. (1998) point out a few 
other demand side policies, including employment subsidies, the promotion of SMMEs, 
industrial recruitment or expansion and area-based economic renewal. 
 
Supply side labour market policies 
Supply-side policies according to Carlin and Soskice (2005) refer to policies that affect wages 
and prices (Carlin and Soskice 2005). The wages will be affected by changes in 
unemployment benefits, minimum wages, union and employment protection legislation, 
child-care policy and the participation by government in negotiations with unions and 
employers associations. According to Carlin and Soskice (2005) the price setting can be 
affected through the changes in competition policy as well as taxes. These policies attempt to 
increase a country’s productivity.   
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The South African government also implement lower tax rate to small business enterprises to 
speed up employment creation (Accountancy SA, 2012). This goes a long way since small 
businesses mostly employ unskilled workers and the unemployed can find it easier to 
establish their own business. The government also lowered corporate taxes in 1999 and again 
in 2005 (Accountancy SA, 2012). This in turn can create employment in the formal sector. 
 
Evans-Klock et al. (1998) point out a few supply-side examples such as the job search 
assistance which help displaced workers in the job search process by providing the displace 
workers with the necessary information for job search, counselling for unemployed workers. 
Another example is support to unemployed workers through job search assistance, training for 
unemployed workers, apprenticeships, job creation measures, self-employment assistance, 
public employment and unemployment benefits (Evans-Klock et al., 1998) 
 
2.2.4 Labour market legislations since the advent of democracy 
(A) Employment Equity Act 
The aim of the Employment Equity Act (EEA) 55 of 1998 is to reduce the labour market 
inequalities. The Act prescribes positive measures to assist the designated groups who were 
previously disadvantaged (blacks, females, the disabled) to overcome the inequality gap. 
According to Barker (2007) the Act stipulates that the employers whose firms have more than 
50 employees must have an Employment Equity Plan as employers must hire a certain 
percentage of the workforce from the designated groups. Since unemployment is concentrated 
around this designated group, this Act attempts to address the problem. Firms are bound by 
the Act and they pay heavy fines if they do not abide by the rules.  
 
(B) Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
This Act 66 of 1995 provides for bargaining council agreements and promotes unionisation 
which are involved in negotiations around numerous issues such as wages, work hours, fringe 
benefits, severance pay, leave and various others (Barker, 2007). This Act further determines 
if workers are allowed to engage in strike action. Strikes protect worker rights and prevent 
exploitation from employers. Thirdly, the LRA provides for labour disputes to be settled 
through The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) which was 
formed to deal with disputes in the workplace. If it is not possible to resolve the disputes, the 
matter will be referred to the Labour Court or the Labour Appeal Court. 
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(C) Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 
The BCEA Act No. 75 of 1997 was formed to advance economic development and social 
justice whose primary objectives are to give and regulate the right to fair labour practice in 
line with the constitution by establishing and regulating variations of the basic conditions of 
employment, such as a 45-hour work week, leave pay, office space, protective clothing, 
recruitment costs, education and training, severance pay (Barker, 2007:77). Since South 
Africa is a member of the ILO, the country is obliged to enforce certain stipulations of the 
basic working conditions set by the ILO. 
 
The 1997 BCEA also aimed to reduce the working hours to 40 hours. However the 45-hour 
working week in South Africa is already lower than those in middle income countries such as 
Turkey, Malaysia and Thailand (Nedlac, 1998). According to the Department of Labour 
(1996) reduced working hours have social benefits such as increased time for education and 
training, family and social responsibilities and leisure time.  
 
The BCEA Act of 1997 was revised in 2002. Barker (2007) is of the view that it was done to 
make provisions for the employment for the improvement of minimum wages and working 
conditions of the 11 most vulnerable sectors (Republic of South Africa, 2002; Department of 
Labour, 2013): children in advertising, artistic, and cultural activities; civil engineering; 
contract cleaning; domestic workers; farm workers; forestry sector; hospitality workers; 
learner ships; private security sector; taxi sector; wholesale and retail sector. 
 
(D) Skills Development Act 
The Skills Development Act (SDA) 97 of 1998 attempts to address the shortcomings in the 
skills development framework (Mohr and Siebrits, 2006). This Act, according to Mohr and 
Siebrits (2006) measures the links between education and training and the labour market. 
According to Mohr and Siebrits (2006), the Act also aims to improve the links between the 
two sectors through the establishment of a Strategic Planning Unit which assists government 
with skills development activities in order to identify the problems in the links between skills 
and employment patterns in the economy. The Act also targets at improving on the job 
training through learner ship programs (Barker, 2007). 
 
This Act allows money to be collected from employers which is channelled to the National 
Skills Development Fund. According to Barker (2007) the Act determines that every 
employer whose annual payroll exceeds R250 000 must contribute 1% of the total payroll to 
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the South African Revenue Services (SARS). Of the funds collected, 20% goes to the 
National Skills Fund (NSF). Each Sectoral Education and Training Authority (SETA) may get 
the remaining 80% of the money paid by the employers in its sector. The SETA uses a certain 
proportion of this funding (below 10%) to cover its administrative costs; the rest of the money 
is paid back as grants to firms that comply with criteria determined by the SETA in terms of 
its sectoral skills plan. These criteria are, for example, the submission of a workplace skills 
plan and the subsequent implementation report on the training provided (Barker, 2007:233). 
 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
 
As there are many theoretical models of unemployment, this section would focus on 
discussing the commonly known models and their impact on unemployment. 
 
2.3.1 Unemployment in a perfectly competitive labour market 
Figure 2.1 presents the simple labour demand and labour supply framework in a perfectly 
competitive labour market. Equilibrium takes place when the labour supply and labour 
demand curves intersect at point E. The equilibrium wage and employment levels are W and 
L respectively. The introduction of a minimum wage of W1, which is above the market-
clearing wage level of W, will lead to employment loss because quantity of labour supplied 
(L1) exceeds the quantity of labour demanded (L2). At the end, employment drops to L2. 
Alternatively, it could be said that retrenchment of (L-L2) takes place due to the introduction 
of the minimum wage. 
 
Figure 2.1: Unemployment in a perfectly competitive labour market with the presence of minimum wage 
 
Source: Barker (2007: 4) 
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In Figure 2.2, the vertical line N represents the LF, L stands for the level of employment, 
while w stands for real wage (W/P) where $W is the nominal wage and $P is the price level. 
 
Figure 2.2: The competitive framework  
 
Source: Laing (2011: 766) 
 
In Figure 2.2(a), a total of (N-L) people in the LF do not want to work at the equilibrium 
wage of wC, as this real wage level is lower than their asking wage. Hence, (N-L) people are 
voluntary unemployed. In contrast, in Figure 2.2(b), all N workers supply their labour 
inelastically resulting in the vertical labour supply curve S0. This shows that there will be no 
voluntary unemployment since everyone wants to work for any positive real wage. At the real 
wage level of wC, the equilibrium position at point C which indicates full employment, as 
everyone in the LF is employed. However, if the real wage is stuck at w0 (e.g. due to the 
imposition of minimum wage), the employers only hire L*0 workers but N workers want to 
work. This creates a situation that (N-L*0) people in the LF are involuntarily unemployed. 
These unemployed would like to work at any wage level but employers are not willing to hire 
them. 
 
Figure 2.3 presents the aggregate demand (AD) / aggregate supply (AS) macroeconomic 
model of Keynes (1936). A higher aggregate price level P translates in lower real wage rates 
and the urge to produce more output. In the long run however, the nominal wage rate varies 
with economic conditions. Because high unemployment results in falling nominal wages, the 
long run supply curve is vertical. In the short run, capital is fixed and wages are sticky. The 
flat region in the short run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) curve is due to the sensitivity in 
the price level. The long-run aggregate supply curve (LRAS) is vertical because economists 
believe that changes in aggregate demand (AD) have only a temporary change on total output. 
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An increase in the AD curve increase the level of real output as well as the average price level 
(P) leading to an increase in employment.  
 
Figure 2.3: The Aggregate Demand (AD) and Aggregate Supply (AS) Model  
 
Source: Glanville (2011: 224) 
 
Figure 2.4 presents the long-run equilibrium of a firm. Initially the equilibrium is at point A, 
with Q2 being the output level. K1and L1 units of capital and labour are used respectively. 
Assuming wage increases (e.g. due to the imposition of minimum wage), it leads to the 
swivelling of the isocost line rightwards along the x-axis. The new equilibrium is at point B. 
Due to the increase of wage, at this new equilibrium point, employment drops from L1 to L2 
while capital units increase from K1 to K2. The dash line is inserted to distinguish the 
substitution effect from the scale effect, and it can be seen from the figure that both effects are 
negative when it comes to the labour quantity. 
 
Figure 2.4: Long-run labour demand  
Capital (K) 
          Scale effect 
          Substitution effect 
 
 
    K2         B 
    K1                   A 
    K3            C   
                                    Q2 
                       Q1 
     
 
         0    L2       L3       L1                             Labour (L) 
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2.3.2 Models involving minimum wages and collective bargaining 
(A) Efficiency wage theory 
If firms pay employees a wage above the equilibrium wage, it is believed that productivity 
will increase (Katz, 1986). Another reason why firms would pay higher wages to employees 
is that workers are union members and firms want to keep the peace with the unions. This 
efficiency wage theory force workers to keep their jobs at all costs (Katz, 1986). The potential 
benefits of the efficiency wage are: increased effort and level and reduced shirking by 
employees (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984); lower turnover cost (Stiglitz, 1974); a higher effort of 
workers (Akerlof, 1982, 1984); choice of the best workers (Weiss, 1980). 
 
Turnover costs provide employees with bargaining power. Insiders can use this bargaining 
power to raise wages to a level that increase unemployment or keep outsiders out. On the 
other hand, insiders can pressurise employers and make it costly for employers to accept 
underbidding by outsiders. The costs of turnover that can be exploited by insiders are direct 
costs of hiring, training and firing (Solow, 1985) as well as costs that arise when insiders are 
prepared to withhold effort and harass new entrants (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). 
 
Figure 2.5 (a) is the good case for employment. At e1 the market is in equilibrium with W1 
wages and L1 amount of labour. With an introduction of an efficiency wage above the market 
equilibrium wage, from W1 to W2 will increase demand for employment from D1 to D2 
because workers are more loyal to employers, less shirking occurs, workers are more 
productive. This will result in an increase of employment from L1 to L3. 
 
Figure 2.5: Efficiency wage theories 
  Figure 2.5(a)    Figure 2.5(b) 
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In Figure 2.5 (b) however, an introduction of an efficiency wage from W1 to W3 which is very 
high and way above the market equilibrium wage. Although the workers would become more 
productive and lead to labour demand to increase from D1 to D2, such productivity increase is 
not rapid enough to keep up with the more rapid increase of wage. This implies the increase 
of unit labour cost. At the end, employment could decline from L1 to L3. Note that some of 
the outsiders actually would not mind to be hired at a wage below W3 (e.g. at the wage level 
WINSIDER). 
 
(B) Insider-outside theory 
Lindbeck and Snower (1986) are of the opinion that there is asymmetry between the currently 
employed (insiders) and the unemployed (outsiders). They argue that insiders prefer high 
minimum wages while outsiders could accept a lower wage to obtain employment. These 
outsiders are not represented when wage negotiation takes place via collective bargaining so 
high minimum wages are the order of the day and wages are sticky downwards. 
 
Insiders are the workers who are currently employed while the outsiders are the unemployed 
and mostly unskilled in the case of South Africa. Bargaining councils (BC) bargain for 
minimum wages among other things. Moll (1995, 1996) is of the opinion that larger firms are 
more capital-intensive, use skilled labour and pay higher wages than smaller firms. Moll 
further argues that the labour market is dominated by larger firms and unions.  
 
If larger firms want to eliminate their competition and their eagerness to strive for higher 
productivity, they agree to a higher minimum wage and unions are too happy to fall for that 
because they want a better deal for their members. Smaller, labour-intensive firms cannot 
afford to pay such a high minimum wage, so they might close down or retrench a lot of 
workers to save production cost. Hence, there is an increase in unemployment.  
 
Since wages are sticky downwards, it is highly unlikely that the minimum wage will be 
decreased. In fact it will rather increase. It means outsiders will find it very difficult to enter 
the workforce. With new entrants entering the labour market, it is likely that unemployment 
will increase. 
 
In Figure 2.6, the upward-sloping green line depicts affordable wage of the firms. Assuming 
the minimum wage is R3 000, for the small, labor-intensive firms, such minimum wage is 
above the affordable wage, and hence these firms would either retrench a lot of workers or 
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even close down. In contrast, for the larger, capital-intensive firms, the affordable wage is 
above the minimum wage. Finally, some of the outsiders who are desperate for employment 
actually may not mind being paid a wage below the minimum wage, for instance, R2 000. 
However, this is not possible, because the minimum wage of R3 000 is legally binding to the 
employers. 
 
Figure 2.6: Insider-outsider theory 
 
Source: Nattrass (2000: 136) 
 
(C) Calmfors-Driffill model 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) developed a theoretical framework to explain the 
macroeconomic performance of an economy in correlation with the level of centralisation in 
wage bargaining structures. They are of the opinion that the level of centralisation in wage 
bargaining is affecting the ability of job creation for work seekers as illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7: Calmfors and Driffill’s hump hypothesis 
  Wage or unemployment level 
 
Source: Calmfors & Drifill (1988:15) 
 
Level of bargaining 
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The figure shows that where wage bargaining is centralised at point C there are low levels of 
real wages coupled with low unemployment. In the case where wage bargaining is semi-
centralised as in Point B, real wages and unemployment are high where as in the case of 
decentralised wage bargaining at Point A wage unemployment and real wages are low. If 
Calmfors and Driffill’s theory is applied in South Africa, it would be at Point B. Wage 
unemployment and real wages are high.  
 
The reason for the inverted U-shaped curve is as follows: if centralisation is high, wage 
negotiations are bargained by a few large organisations, trade unions will consider the 
inflationary impact of higher wages and they will lower their demands for higher wages. If the 
price of real income is higher than the rise in real income, firm will be forced to fire workers 
to survive. In contrast, if the wage bargaining is decentralised at company level, the wage 
levels are expected to remain low due to the bargaining processes by the many weak trade 
unions. Firms face increased costs, competition will then decrease and they will have to fire 
workers. Hence, unemployment level would become higher. 
 
Currently in South Africa, collective bargaining is semi-centralised at sectoral or industrial 
level, and this is why it is argued that this lead to worsening of employment. 
 
(D) Hick’s model on strikes 
Hicks explains his paradox through the mistakes that were made during the bargaining 
process. These mistakes are could have prevented a strike or the duration of a strike. An 
agreement could have been reached before a strike. Figure 2.8 gives a graphical explanation 
of the problem. The vertical axis measures the wages and the horizontal axis measures the 
duration of the strike. The CC curve is the employer’s concession curve which is its 
maximum offer at each point during the strike. At the start of the dispute t=0, the firm is 
willing to agree to only the low wage Wf0. As the strike continues, the cost of the strike rises. 
In this case the employer will gradually soften it bargaining stance, so the CC curve gradually 
rises to an acceptable wage level. On the other hand, the schedule RR is the union’s resistance 
curve. It depicts the lowest wage that is acceptable to the union. Initially the union starts at a 
high wage, but as the strike continues the union starts to give in to some demands so the 
employees are worried about retrenchment. This explains why the RR curve is downward-
sloping.  
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Figure 2.8: Hicks model of strike duration 
 
Source: Laing (2011: 14) 
 
If there are changes in the economic environment such as the payment of unemployment 
benefits to strikers or strong support from the political parties, this will cause the workers to 
confidently increase the asking wage at each strike duration. In this case the RR curve will 
shift upwards to a new R’R’ curve which increases the duration of the strike. The union’s 
resistance curve increases to R’R’ as the strike continues from t’ to t’’. Unions eventually 
settle for a higher wage at equilibrium E’. If the strike duration is too long, firms could 
ultimately replace striking workers with temporary workers who can easily be replaced by 
capital, thereby resulting in increase of unemployment. 
 
2.3.3 Other models 
(A) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition model on employment discrimination 
Figure 2.9 presents a simple version of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition model (for the 
detailed econometric explanation which falls beyond the scope of this study, refer to Burger 
and Jafta 2006), assuming educational attainment is the only factor affecting the likelihood of 
employment. Given the employment likelihood probit regressions of whites and blacks are 
follows: 
 Whites: Prob (Employed) = 0.3 + 0.05 × years of education 
 Black  Prob (Employed) = 0.2 + 0.04 × years of education 
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Figure 2.9: A simple Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition model on employment discrimination by race 
 
 
The constant and slope parameters of the probit regressions already suggest the presence of 
employment discrimination against blacks. Firstly, for a black jobseeker with no schooling, 
his likelihood of employment is 20% but for a white jobseeker also with no schooling, 
someone his employment likelihood if bigger at 30%. Secondly, if the black’s educational 
attainment increases by one year, his employment likelihood would increase by 4 percentage 
points, whilst a white’s employment probability would show a greater 5 percentage point 
increase if his educational attainment also increases by one year. 
 
It is further given that the mean years of education are equal to 13 and 10 years for white and 
black workers respectively. The probability of whites getting employed is 95% (0.3 + 
0.05×13) while that of the blacks is 60% (0.2 + 0.04×10). However, it is unusual that for a 
white worker with the same years of education (10) as the average black, his employment 
likelihood is greater at 80% (0.3 + 0.05×10). Hence, it is argued that such 20 percentage-point 
difference (80%-60%) stands for the unexplained component, which implies employment 
discrimination against the blacks.  
 
Now assuming that the blacks’ employment probit regression is exactly the same as that of 
the whites. As it was given initially that the blacks have an average educational attainment of 
10 years, his employment likelihood would be 80% (0.3 + 0.05×10), while an average white 
would have an employment likelihood of 95% (0.3 + 0.05×12). This 15 percentage-point 
difference (95%-80%) stands for the explained component, as it is acceptable for whites to 
have a greater employment likelihood due to the fact that they are more educated on average.  
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The unexplained component (0.20) as proportion of the total racial employment probability 
gap (0.35) is equal to 57.14% (0.20/0.35). In other words, the key message of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition result is that blacks are subject to employment discrimination and 
associated with a greater likelihood of unemployment (or smaller likelihood of employment). 
 
(B) High reservation wage 
A person in the LF would choose not to work if the market wage is lower than the reservation 
wage. In other words, this person will only enter the labour market if the market wage is 
higher than the reservation wage. In Figure 2.10, a low market wage level of W0 is not enough 
to attract someone with a reservation wage of W* to enter the labour market for work, so he 
would decide to remain inactive or unemployed. In other words, equilibrium is at point P.  
 
Figure 2.10: Impact of reservation wage on labour supply 
 
Source: Laing (2011: 125) 
 
However, if the market wage increases to W1 which is above W*, the person would be willing 
to supply his labour services, and at the end, equilibrium takes place point E. The person 
would reduce his leisure time from T to l*1, and work hours would increase from zero to (T-
l*1). Also, utility increases from U0 to U1. 
 
2.4 Main causes of unemployment 
 
As there are too many causes of unemployment in South Africa, this section would only 
selectively highlight some of the main causes. 
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2.4.1 Rigidities in the labour market 
There are two schools of thought: labour market flexibility where enterprises can easily adjust 
to meet demands of business and labour market rigidities where there is little or no room for 
adjustment in the labour market (Barker, 2007). According to Barker (2007) labour market 
rigidities is unproductive in that enterprises are unable to adjust to technological changes, 
economic circumstances and international competition. This is the reason why the labour 
market is not effective and productivity so low.  
 
Since pressure is put on employers to employ permanent labour at high wages which increase 
labour costs, employers are somewhat forced to convert to capital-intensive industries. This in 
turn has a negative effect on employment (Barker, 2007). Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen 
(2009) argue that the unions have too much power in South Africa in particular. The unions 
pressurise the employers for higher wages and better working conditions which eventually 
increase labour cost. This is further enhanced by the stringent labour laws in South Africa. 
Due to these factors and more, it is difficult to address the unemployment problem effectively 
in South Africa. Barker (2007) is of the opinion that these labour market rigidities hamper 
employment creation. 
 
The effects of the labour market rigidities in South Africa can be seen in the indicators of the 
World Competitive Report (2015) (Global Competitive Index). South Africa is ranked 113th 
out of 144 countries in the labour market efficiency index. In the health and primary 
education sector, South Africa is ranked 132nd, which is an indication of the skills shortage. 
The skills shortage is further evident in that South Africa is ranked 86th in the higher 
education and training sector. However everything is doom and gloom for South Africa, the 
country is ranked 7th out of 144 countries in the financial market development sector.  
 
2.4.2 High reservation wage 
A reservation wage is a wage that new entrant to the labour market expects to earn. A high 
reservation wage is above the market wage. If new entrants find that their reservation wage 
cannot be paid by the employer, they withhold their labour and do not enter the labour market 
at all. This is especially the case for the youth in South Africa. Nattrass and Walker (2005) 
found that in metropolitan areas, the reservation wage of the working class people is too high. 
The employers are not willing to pay that high reservation wage. Since new entrants to the 
labour market choose not to work, it increases unemployment and, due to the high reservation 
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wage, this would become chronic, long-term unemployment. Heintz and Posel (2008) found 
that “unrealistic wage expectations” account for the levels of persistence of unemployment. 
 
2.4.3 Barriers of entry to informal sector 
The informal sector employment in South Africa is small which only accounts for 30% of the 
total employment in comparison to other developing economies such as India where it is 90% 
of the total employment (Kulshreshtha and Sign, 1998). The unemployed do not enter this 
sector because they cannot afford to start their own business according to Kingdon and Knight 
(2000).It is also argued that there are various barriers that prevent the unemployed from 
entering the informal sector: crime, the lack of capital, land, credit, and infrastructure and 
training facilities, especially in the Black townships (Manning and Mashing, 1993; Kaplinsky, 
1995; Kingdon and Knight 2000 & 2004). 
 
2.4.4 Skills mismatch 
The South African economy is still very much reliant on the primary sector and to a lesser 
extent on the manufacturing sector. However, according to Bhorat et al. (2014), South Africa 
has already undergone industrialisation but South Africa still export a substantial amount of 
raw material and import a huge amount of finished goods.  
 
The economy should produce its own products from its own raw materials Acemlogu and 
Robinson (2012). In this way the country will also be able to reduce unemployment. In order 
to achieve this, according to Davies and Van Seventer (2012), industrial parks should be set 
up near townships and rural areas. Women should also play a bigger role in management 
positions (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). 
 
But for the country to produce its own finished goods, South Africa needs more skilled 
workers. Despite a number of education reforms, like changes to the school curricula, South 
Africa still face skill shortages. According to Bhorat, Meyer and Mlatsheni (2002), the Centre 
for the Development and Enterprise (2007b) and Kraak (2008), there is consensus that skills 
shortages are major obstacles to economic growth and job creation in South Africa. The South 
African government should try to convert more schools to skilled schools in terms of 
technology and improve the effectiveness of Further Education and Training Colleges (FET). 
 
Further, Bhorat (2009: 21) argues that the gradual skills-biased labour demand trajectory 
leads to a dramatic decline in the demand for unskilled workers across most industries, 
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matched in turn by an increase in the demand for highly-skilled workers.  He asserts that the 
key cause for these altered labour demand preferences is technological changes that occur 
within firms and industries. As a result, this not only increases unemployment levels for those 
unskilled workers, but also ensures that new labour force entrants without the requisite skills 
and qualifications would find it increasingly hardly to find employment.  
 
The extent of skills mismatch structural unemployment in South Africa would be examined in 
great detail in the empirical analysis, when the characteristics of labour force and employed 
are looked at. 
 
2.4.5  Employment discrimination 
Before 1995 the earnings for Whites were much higher than for the other population groups 
but the gap has somewhat narrowed after 1995 (Burger and Jafta, 2006).It is further found 
that after 10 years of democracy, there was still employment and wage discrimination among 
the different population groups with the Blacks the worst in terms of wage increases. 
However, according to Burger and Jafta (2006), the skilled employment is concentrated 
among Whites while unskilled employment is concentrated among Blacks.  
 
Burger and Jafta (2006) conducted thee Oaxaca Blinder decomposition to evaluate 
employment discrimination and found that Affirmative Action policies, which are supposed to 
address the inequalities within the workplace between Black and White workers, did not have 
the desired affect by 2004. Furthermore, they found that since many whites are employed in 
the skilled labour force and most Blacks in the unskilled labour force, and the mean wage gap 
between Black workers and White workers remains high. However, when Burger and Jafta 
(2006) tested the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition, they found that the wage gap at the top 
is narrowing between Blacks and Whites. They also found that the government’s education 
policies did not address the quality of education among Blacks and Whites in that Black 
children are still exposed to low quality education. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The unemployment problem in South Africa is difficult to understand. In the conceptual 
framework, it is clear that unemployment is not so easy to explain in general. South Africa’s 
case makes it even worse. The few models that were discussed in the theoretical framework 
give some kind of explanation, but not the whole explanation. However the causes of 
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unemployment do give some insight to explain the reasons behind the country’s persistently 
high unemployment. In searching for answers to the unemployment situation in South Africa, 
more information and data should be explored. The theory discussed above, only scratch the 
surface. This study tries to look for the answers in more discussions that follow. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the methodology and data for the forthcoming quantitative and 
qualitative analysis.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
In Chapter Four, a quantitative analysis would be conducted to examine the labour market 
trends in 1995-2014, focusing on the demographic characteristics of the employed and 
unemployed. On the other hand, a qualitative analysis would be conducted in Chapter Five to 
evaluate the success of the labour market policies that have been implemented or currently 
being implemented, as well as the feasibility of alternative policies that are not yet 
implemented in South Africa. 
 
3.3  Data 
 
For the quantitative analysis in Chapter Four, the following data released by Stats SA would 
be used: 
 October Household Survey (OHS) 1995-1999: this survey took place once every year. 
 Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000-2007: this survey replaced the OHS in 2000 and 
took place twice a year (in March and September). 
 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 2008-2014: this survey replaced the LFS in 
2008 and currently takes place four times a year. 
 
The narrow definition of labour market status would be adopted when conducting the analysis 
in Chapter Four, unless stated otherwise. Finally, for the remainder of the study, the March 
LFS would be referred to as survey ‘a’ (e.g. LFS 2000a, LFS 2001a, and so forth) while the 
September LFS would be referred to as survey ‘b’ (e.g. LFS 2004b, LFS 2005b, and so forth). 
On the other hand, the four QLFSs would be referred to as Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 respectively 
(e.g. QLFS 2008Q1, QLFS 2008Q2, QLFS2008Q3, QLFS2008Q4, QLFS2009Q1, etc.). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LABOUR MARKET TRENDS, 1995-2014 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the labour market trends in 1995-2014, focusing on the demographic 
and educational attainment characteristics of the employed and unemployed, as well as the 
work activities of the employed. 
 
4.2 Labour market trends in 1995-2014 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that the number of people employed increased rapidly from 1995 to 2000. 
However at the same time it was also the case for the number of unemployed people. The 
number of employed then stabilised somewhat from 2001 to 2004, before an upward trend 
took place again since 2005, with the number peaking at 14.78 million in the last quarter of 
2008. The number of employed decreased by 1 million in 2009 due to the global economic 
recession, before an upward trend took place again since 2010, with the number rising to 
15.35 million in the last quarter of 2014. 
 
Figure 4.1: Labour market aggregates under the narrow definition: 1995-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the OHS 1995-1999, LFS 2000-2007 and QLFS 2008-2014 data. 
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As far as the labour force (LF) is concerned, it shows a very similar trend as the number of 
employed. A worrying finding is that there is some indicating of the widening of the gap 
between the LF number and employed number, and this suggests that the extent of increase of 
employment may not be rapid enough to absorb the net entrants into the LF. This would be 
explored in greater detail later when the employment absorption rate (EAR) is derived. 
Finally, the number of unemployed increase since 1995 and peaked at 5.11 million in 2003, 
before a promising downward trend took place. However, in recent years, an upward trend 
took place again, causing the number of unemployed to reach an all-time highest level of 5.15 
million in the third quarter of 2014. 
 
In Figure 4.2, the labour force participation rate (LFPR) decreased from 1995 to 1996. After 
1996 the, it increased sharply until 2000a when it peaked above 60% for the first time. It was 
then followed by a general downward trend up to 2004 and an upward trend from 2005 to 
2008, then a decreasing trend after 2008.From, 2009 the LFPR stabilised between 55% and 
57% until 2014.  
 
Figure 4.2: Labour force participation rates and unemployment rates under narrow definition: 1995-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations using the OHS 1995-1999, LFS 2000-2007 and QLFS 2008-2014 data. 
 
Table 4.1 shows the target growth rate (TGR), actual growth rate (AGR) and employment 
absorption rate (EAR) between 1995 and 2014.  
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 The TGR is the rate at which employment must grow to provide employment to all the 
net entrants to the labour market between two time periods (from period X to period Y) 
which must be consecutive. Oosthuizen (2006) defines the 𝑇𝐺𝑅 =
𝐿𝐹𝑌−𝐿𝐹𝑋
𝐸𝑋
  where LF is 
the labour force and E the employed.  
 AGR is the growth rate of the number of employed from period X to period Y and is 
calculated  
𝐸𝑌−𝐸𝑋
𝐸𝑋
 
 EAR is the proportion of the net increase in the labour force from period X to period Y 
that find employment during the same period which is calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝑌−𝐸𝑋
𝐿𝐹𝑌−𝐿𝐹𝑋
=
𝐴𝐺𝑅
𝑇𝐺𝑅
 . An EAR of 100% implies the full net increase in the labour force between two 
periods were employed.  
 
From Table 4.1, it can be seen that for all net entrants into the labour force to find jobs, 
employment would need to grow by 91.9% between 1995 and 2014. Nonetheless, the actual 
employment growth rate was only 61.6%, which resulted in the EAR of 67.0%. This means 
that the employment growth was not fast enough to take care of all the net entrants to the 
labour market from 1995 to 2014, as out of the 100 entrants to the labour force, only 67 of 
them were able to find employment. This may explain the recent widening gap of the LF 
number and employed number, as discussed previously in Figure 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Target growth rates, actual growth rates and employment absorption rates, 1995-2014 
 Labour force Employed 
OHS 1995 11 527 589 9 499 347 
LFS 2005b 16 770 161 12 287 798 
QLFS 2014Q4 20 258 059 15 352 782 
 
OHS 1995 vs. LFS 2005b 
TGR 55.2% 
AGR 29.4% 
EAR 53.2% 
LFS 2005b vs. QLFS 2014Q4 
TGR 28.4% 
AGR 24.9% 
EAR 87.9% 
OHS 1995 vs. QLFS 2014Q4 
TGR 91.9% 
AGR 61.6% 
EAR 67.0% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1995, LFS 2005b and QLFS 2014Q4 data. 
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4.3 Characteristics of the employed and unemployed 
 
Table 4.2 shows a general increase in employment between 1995 and 2014. The biggest 
increase was between 2005 and 2014 of 3 million. The increase for Blacks was 5.1 million 
between 1995 and 2014. In 2014, the Blacks’ share in employment was 73.4%, compared to 
only 60.9% in 1995. This increase, according to Festus et al. (2015) could be attributed to the 
increase of educational attainment of the black work seekers and Affirmative Action policies 
which may have improved the Blacks’ employment likelihood. 
 
Table 4.2: Demographic characteristics of the employed: 1995, 2005 and 2014 
 
1995 2005 2014 1995 2005 2014 
Number of employed Share of employed 
All 9 499 347 12 287 798 15 352 782 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
By gender 
  Male 5 789 311 7 047 991 8 659 217 60.9% 57.4% 56.4% 
  Female 3 710 036 5 235 926 6 693 565 39.1% 42.6% 43.6% 
Unspecified 0 3 881 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
By race 
  Black 6 136 137 8 497 599 11 261 634 64.6% 69.2% 73.4% 
  Coloured 1 144 836 1 327 511 1 635 627 12.1% 10.8% 10.7% 
  Indian 358 589 440 182 506 753 3.8% 3.6% 3.3% 
  White 1 859 785 1 991 480 1 948 768 19.6% 16.2% 12.7% 
  Unspecified 0 31 026 0 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
By province 
  Western Cape 1 353 355 1 723 524 2 176 934 14.2% 14.0% 14.2% 
  Eastern Cape 917 098 1 350 414 1 338 227 9.7% 11.0% 8.7% 
  Northern Cape 212 901 229 547 320 209 2.2% 1.9% 2.1% 
  Free State 752 051 795 632 771 239 7.9% 6.5% 5.0% 
  KwaZulu-Natal 1 712 758 2 175 385 2 525 672 18.0% 17.7% 16.5% 
  North West 749 330 926 800 948 342 7.9% 7.5% 6.2% 
  Gauteng 2 637 048 3 438 808 4 895 685 27.8% 28.0% 31.9% 
  Mpumalanga 583 856 777 155 1 140 699 6.1% 6.3% 7.4% 
  Limpopo 580 950 870 533 1 235 775 6.1% 7.1% 8.0% 
By age cohort 
  15-24 years 1 124 324 1 414 874 1 290 308 11.8% 11.5% 8.4% 
  25-34 years 3 275 749 4 149 552 4 800 291 34.5% 33.8% 31.3% 
  35-44 years 2 858 183 3 248 822 4 739 458 30.1% 26.4% 30.9% 
  45-54 years 1 586 764 2 372 862 3 123 571 16.7% 19.3% 20.3% 
  55-65 years 654 327 1 101 688 1 399 154 6.9% 9.0% 9.1% 
By education 
  Primary 2 309 331 2 282 800 1 440 570 24.3% 18.6% 9.4% 
  Secondary 3 682 335 4 698 212 5 763 718 38.8% 38.2% 37.5% 
  Matric 2 093 433 3 348 071 4 854 331 22.0% 27.2% 31.6% 
  Matric + Cert/Dip 888 596 1 080 437 1 692 230 9.4% 8.8% 11.0% 
  Degree 444 862 782 937 1 433 436 4.7% 6.4% 9.3% 
  Unspecified 80 790 95 341 168 497 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1995, LFS 2005b and QLFS 2014Q4 data. 
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The female share of employed increased from 39.1% to 43.6% from 1995 to 2014. The share 
of employed aged 15 to 34 years decreased from 46.3% in 1995 to 39.7% in 2014. This means 
that more of the youth joined the unemployment population, rubberstamping the South 
African’s government’s policy of the youth wage subsidy. 
 
Looking at what happened by province, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape account 
for the highest share of total employment throughout the years. Gauteng however shows the 
largest increase of employment of more than 2 million from 1995-2014. However looking at 
the share of employment there are declines in Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, 
KwaZulu-Natal and North West. 
 
Those with Matric or above account for an increasing share of employed, rising from 36.1% 
in 1995 to 51.9% in 2014. This result suggests the structural change towards the employment 
of more skilled workers (Festus et al. 2015).Figure 4.3 depicts the mean years of educational 
attainment of the employed. From 1995 to 1999 the mean years of education were hovering 
around 9 years until it dropped in 2000 to an all-time low of between 8 and 9 years of 
schooling. After that, it was increasing at a gradual rate to almost 11 years of schooling. This 
result once again confirms the structural change of the South African economy, with the more 
educated, more skilled workers being of greater demand. 
 
Figure 4.3: Mean years of educational attainment of employed 
 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1995-1999, LFS 2000-2007 and QLFS 2008-2014 data. 
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In Figure 4.4, it can be seen that the primary sector’s share of employed decreased 
considerably compared to the secondary and tertiary sectors. This is attributed by the decrease 
in employment in the mining and agricultural sectors as mechanisation took centre stage as 
the economy was developing. It is clear that South Africa is very different from other African 
economies that still rely heavily on the primary sector. The tertiary sector has the highest 
share in employment, rising from 57% in 1995 to 69% in 2014. 
 
Figure 4.4: Proportion of employed by sector 
 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1995-1999, LFS 2000-2007 and QLFS 2008-2014 data. 
 
Table 4.3 depicts the demographic characteristics of the unemployed estimates under the 
narrow definition in 1995, 2005 and 2014. The number of unemployed increased by 2.8 
million between 1995 and 2014. Blacks have the highest share of unemployment all the way 
(hovering around 85%) as well as the highest increase in unemployment in absolute terms 
(rising from 1.69 million in 1995 to 4.19 million in 2014). In contrast, looking at gender, the 
number of male unemployed between 1995 and 2005 was less than the female unemployed 
but is not the case in 2014. The unemployment rate for females have decreased in 2014, and it 
could be attributed to the Affirmative Action policies where firms are required to hire more 
female workers (Festus et al., 2015). 
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Table 4.3: Demographic characteristics of the unemployed: 1995, 2005 and 2014 
 
1995 2005 2014 1995 2005 2014 
Number of unemployed Share of unemployed 
All 2 028 242 4 482 363 4 905 277 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
By gender 
  Male 923 658 2 055 067 2 493 248 45.5% 45.8% 50.8% 
  Female 1 104 584 2 424 925 2 412 029 54.5% 54.1% 49.2% 
Unspecified 0 2 371 0 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
By race 
  Black 1 693 162 3 905 601 4 189 897 83.5% 87.1% 85.4% 
  Coloured 216 804 384 065 485 119 10.7% 8.6% 9.9% 
  Indian 42 471 82 342 68 514 2.1% 1.8% 1.4% 
  White 75 805 105 671 161 747 3.7% 2.4% 3.3% 
  Unspecified 0 4 684 0 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
By province 
  Western Cape 216 463 402 214 642 490 10.7% 9.0% 13.1% 
  Eastern Cape 294 421 574 657 548 536 14.5% 12.8% 11.2% 
  Northern Cape 54 544 75 463 128 952 2.7% 1.7% 2.6% 
  Free State 106 305 345 060 366 078 5.2% 7.7% 7.5% 
  KwaZulu-Natal 447 701 1 061 485 662 618 22.1% 23.7% 13.5% 
  North West 155 647 349 184 319 399 7.7% 7.8% 6.5% 
  Gauteng 492 671 1 013 390 1 592 233 24.3% 22.6% 32.5% 
  Mpumalanga 115 250 285 804 411 525 5.7% 6.4% 8.4% 
  Limpopo 145 240 375 106 233 446 7.2% 8.4% 4.8% 
By age cohort 
  15-24 years 645 657 1 499 287 1 230 416 31.8% 33.4% 25.1% 
  25-34 years 820 958 1 807 046 2 018 905 40.5% 40.3% 41.2% 
  35-44 years 365 998 720 796 1 115 228 18.0% 16.1% 22.7% 
  45-54 years 152 754 355 238 437 306 7.5% 7.9% 8.9% 
  55-65 years 42 875 99 996 103 422 2.1% 2.2% 2.1% 
By education 
  Primary 515 612 718 773 375 924 25.4% 16.0% 7.7% 
  Secondary 999 526 2 274 280 2 548 956 49.3% 50.7% 52.0% 
  Matric 439 099 1 313 350 1 601 604 21.6% 29.3% 32.7% 
  Matric + Cert/Dip 50 843 127 336 241 482 2.5% 2.8% 4.9% 
  Degree 11 459 30 509 101 382 0.6% 0.7% 2.1% 
  Unspecified 11 703 18 115 35 929 0.6% 0.4% 0.7% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1995, LFS 2005b and QLFS 2014Q4 data. 
 
Looking at the results by province, Gauteng accounts for the highest share of unemployed in 
2014 (approximately one-third). On the other hand, those without Matric accounted for 60% 
or above of unemployed in all three surveys. A worrying finding is that even the share of 
unemployed with Matric shows an upward, and this suggests that having a Matric certificate 
only may no longer be sufficient to guarantee employment (i.e. post-Matric qualifications 
may be required, due to the structural change of the economy). Finally, those aged 15-34 
years account for the greatest share of unemployed. To conclude, the unemployment 
likelihood is greater for the labour force who are Blacks, aged 15-34 years, residing in 
Gauteng, and without post-Matric qualifications. 
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Table 4.4 depicts the unemployment rates by demographic characteristics. The unemployment 
rate of the LF as a whole increased from 17.6% in 1995 to 24.2% in 2014, meaning the 
ASGISA goal of reducing unemployment rate to 15% by the end of 2014 was not achieved by 
the government. Both the male and female unemployment rates exceeded 20% in 2014, while 
the black unemployment rate has always been the highest compared with those of the other 
three race groups. 
 
Table 4.4: Unemployment rates by demographic characteristics 
 1995 2005 2014 
Unemployment rate 
All All 17.6% 26.7% 24.2% 
Gender 
Male 13.8% 22.6% 22.4% 
Female 22.9% 31.7% 26.5% 
Race 
Black 21.6% 31.5% 27.1% 
Coloured 15.9% 22.4% 22.9% 
Indian 10.6% 15.8% 11.9% 
White 3.9% 5.0% 7.7% 
Province 
Western Cape 13.8% 18.9% 22.8% 
Eastern Cape 24.3% 29.9% 29.1% 
Northern Cape 20.4% 24.7% 28.7% 
Free State 12.4% 30.3% 32.2% 
KwaZulu-Natal 20.7% 32.8% 20.8% 
North West 17.2% 27.4% 25.2% 
Gauteng 15.7% 22.8% 24.5% 
Mpumalanga 16.5% 26.9% 26.5% 
Limpopo 20.0% 30.1% 15.9% 
Age cohort 
15-24 years 36.5% 51.4% 48.8% 
25-34 years 20.0% 30.3% 29.6% 
35-44 years 11.4% 18.2% 19.0% 
45-54 years 8.8% 13.0% 12.3% 
55-65 years 6.1% 8.3% 6.9% 
Education 
Primary 18.3% 23.9% 20.7% 
Secondary 21.3% 32.6% 30.7% 
Matric 17.3% 28.2% 24.8% 
Matric + Cert/Dip 5.4% 10.5% 12.5% 
Degree 2.5% 3.8% 6.6% 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1995, LFS 2005b and QLFS 2014Q4 data. 
 
Looking at the results by province, it is surprising that in 2014, unemployment rate is the 
lowest in Limpopo (which is one of the least developed provinces), while unemployment rate 
is the highest in Free State, followed by Eastern Cape and Northern Cape. Furthermore, as 
expected, unemployment rate increases as one moves across to the younger age cohorts, with 
the rate being as high as 48.8% for the 15-24 years cohort, but as low as 6.9% in the 55-65 
years cohort in 2014. Finally, those with Degrees only have 6.6% likelihood to be 
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unemployed in 2014, but this rate is 20.7% and 30.7% for those with primary and secondary 
educational attainment respectively. Finally, it is worrying that the unemployment rate of 
those with Matric only is quite high at 24.8%, and this result once again confirms the earlier 
finding that having Matric certificate does not lead to promising labour market outcome these 
days. 
 
Figure 4.5 depicts the proportion of the unemployed who never worked before in the fourth 
quarter of 2014 QLFS. The proportion for the age group 15-24 years is extremely high at 
70%. This suggests that people from this age cohort may be struggling badly to find their first 
job. According to Festus et al. (2015) there is a need for government support in terms of 
active labour market policies, such as the Employment Equity Bill, Expanded Public Works 
Program, job-seeking transport subsidy, etc.  
 
Figure 4.5: Proportion of unemployed who never worked before 
 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2014Q4 data. 
 
As far as those unemployed with previous work experience, Figure 4.6 depicts the proportion 
of them last worked more than three years ago in the fourth quarter of 2014 QLFS. It can be 
seen that 38% of them last worked more than three years ago. Also, this proportion was 
higher for females (42%) compared to males (34%). On the other hand, this proportion was 
relatively higher for unemployed from Gauteng (47%) and Free State (40%). Finally, the last 
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five columns of the figure show that a higher educational attainment is associated with a 
lower likelihood of unemployed having worked more than three years ago.  
 
Figure 4.6: Proportion of unemployed with previous work experience who last worked more than three 
years ago 
 
Source: Own calculations using QLFS 2014Q4 data. 
 
This chapter concludes by deriving the index of sectoral shift of formal sector employment in 
selected periods. The index is derived as follows (Suen and Chan, 1997: 28): 
  '
2
1
ssIndex  
Where s stands for employment share of the sector in one year, while s’ represents 
employment share of the same sector in another year. The absolute value of the change in 
employment share represents the minimum fraction of workers who left or joined this 
particular sector in the interim period. 
 
Looking at the share of formal sector employment in each broad industry category in Table 
4.5, it can be seen that the share being accounted for by the two unskilled, primary industry 
categories (i.e. agriculture and mining) declined throughout the years. For instance, the share 
accounted for by the agriculture industry dropped from 7.7% in 1997 to 5.44% in 2014, while 
the mining share decreased from 5.99% in 1997 to 3.88% in 2014. In contrast, the finance 
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industry’s share more than doubled from 6.4% in 1997 to 15.83% in 2014. Finally, the index 
of sectoral shift was 0.1251 between 1997 and 2014. 
 
Table 4.5: Indices of sectoral shifts of formal sector employment, selected periods 
  
  
OHS1997 LFS2002 LFS2003 QLFS2008 
Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 495 530 0.0776 787 163 0.1063 781 244 0.1044 639 448 0.0630 
Mining and quarrying 382 438 0.0599 549 168 0.0742 551 788 0.0737 344 889 0.0340 
Manufacturing 1 347 211 0.2110 1 381 096 0.1866 1 318 278 0.1762 1 787 298 0.1761 
Electricity, gas and water supply 106 680 0.0167 83 082 0.0112 79 095 0.0106 86 894 0.0086 
Construction 319 532 0.0500 319 660 0.0432 338 217 0.0452 844 589 0.0832 
Wholesale and retail trade 1 070 663 0.1677 1 166 431 0.1576 1 274 679 0.1703 1 989 562 0.1960 
Transport, storage and communication 408 500 0.0640 421 425 0.0569 403 566 0.0539 547 499 0.0539 
Financial, insurance and business services 611 883 0.0958 898 770 0.1214 853 475 0.1140 1 497 288 0.1475 
Community/social/personal services 1 643 473 0.2574 1 795 466 0.2426 1 883 330 0.2517 2 412 378 0.2377 
  6 385 910 1.0000 7 402 261 1.0000 7 483 672 1.0000 10 149 845 1.0000 
Index of sectoral shift 1997-2002: 0.0686 2003-2008: 0.0972 
  
  
QLFS2009 QLFS2014 OHS1997 QLFS2014 
Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 599 104 0.0598 593 317 0.0544 495 530 0.0776 593 317 0.0544 
Mining and quarrying 355 198 0.0355 423 047 0.0388 382 438 0.0599 423 047 0.0388 
Manufacturing 1 726 651 0.1724 1 507 404 0.1381 1 347 211 0.2110 1 507 404 0.1381 
Electricity, gas and water supply 107 690 0.0108 100 482 0.0092 106 680 0.0167 100 482 0.0092 
Construction 809 572 0.0808 766 465 0.0702 319 532 0.0500 766 465 0.0702 
Wholesale and retail trade 1 901 251 0.1898 2 060 919 0.1888 1 070 663 0.1677 2 060 919 0.1888 
Transport, storage and communication 539 276 0.0538 693 877 0.0636 408 500 0.0640 693 877 0.0636 
Financial, insurance and business services 1 557 757 0.1555 1 727 914 0.1583 611 883 0.0958 1 727 914 0.1583 
Community/social/personal services 2 418 767 0.2415 3 040 942 0.2786 1 643 473 0.2574 3 040 942 0.2786 
  10 015 266 1.0000 10 914 367 1.0000 6 385 910 1.0000 10 914 367 1.0000 
 Index of sectoral shift 2009-2014: 0.0529 1997-2014: 0.1251 
Source: Own calculations using OHS 1997, LFS 2002 September, LFS 2003 September, and QLFS 
2008Q4, 2009Q1 and 2014Q4 data. 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a review of the South African labour market in 1995-2014, looking at 
the LF, LFPR, employed, work activities of employed, unemployed, unemployment rate, as 
well as proportion of unemployed who never worked before and those unemployed with prior 
work experience but last worked more than three years ago. The general findings are that 
although employment increased during the period under study, it was not rapid enough to 
absorb all the net entrants into the labour force. Therefore, this resulted in an employment 
absorption rate (EAR) of only 67% in 1995-2014, and both the level and rate of 
unemployment increased during the period under study. Also, the unemployed are more likely 
to be Blacks, aged below 35 years, residing in Gauteng, without post-Matric qualifications, 
and having been struggling to look for their first job or last worked more than three years. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CRITICAL EVALUATION OF VARIOUS LABOUR MARKET 
POLICIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter attempts to critically evaluate various job creation policies. Some of the policies 
have been introduced in South Africa. Other policies are still under discussion and hence not 
implemented yet, but may have been introduced in other countries. Hence, the feasibility of 
these alternative policies for the South African economy would be examined. 
 
5.2 Critical evaluation of policies that are implemented in South Africa 
 
5.2.1 Promotion of SMMEs 
The National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 regard SMMEs as economic survival 
enterprises that are self-owned with very little capital and assets (Turner, Varghase and 
Walker, 2008:8). The South African government has mandated sector-specific national and 
provincial departments to deliver on SMME development through the EPWP (Maia, 
2006:16). Government also support SMMEs through a reduction of tariffs and exchange 
controls, offering tax incentives and investment in economic infrastructure (Malefane, 2011). 
The government also support SMMEs financially through the Khula Financial Enterprise Ltd 
which establish a fund of R80 million in 2005 to support SMME development (Agupusi, 
2007:6). But Turner et al. (2002) reckon that SMMEs also have access to credit through 
commercial banks. 
 
The South African government started in 1994 with the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) where one of the objectives was to build one million houses in five years’ 
time (Terreblanche, 1999). By building these houses jobs would have been created. In this 
case some of the SMMEs will be contracted to deliver on this promise and in so doing be able 
to create jobs. 
 
The RDP objectives were not met and the South African government revisited the 
programme. In 1996 they started a new programme the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) programme. The aim was to introduce certain macroeconomic 
policies so that the economy can grow at 6% per annum by 2000 with one of the objectives to 
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create jobs (Khamfula, 2004). With the job creation programmes that government would 
tackle, many of the programmes would have been outsourced to SMMEs.  
 
When the RDP and GEAR did not meet their objectives, the South African government 
started with the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) in 2006 
and the National Industrial Policy Action Plan in 2007. The idea of these two policies was to 
focus on agro processing in order to empower SMMEs by lending capital and awarding 
government contracts to SMMEs. In this way SMMEs would be able to create significant 
employment for micro enterprises and poor households especially in the rural remote areas 
(PCAS, 2006). 
 
Given the continuous government support to promote the SMMEs as already discussed above, 
it is somewhat surprising, if not disappointing, that there is no indication that more workers 
work in the SMMEs. This is evidenced in Figure 5.1, which shows that the number of formal 
sector employees working for firms with fewer than 10 workers has been stagnant at 
approximately 3 million throughout the years. However, the figure rather shows that the 
number of employees reporting they work at larger enterprises with at least 50 workers have 
nearly doubled between 2000 (2.86 million) and 2014 (5.07 million). 
 
Figure 5.1: Total number of workers of the firm that the employees worked at, selected surveys 
 
Source: Own calculations using the LFS 2000b, 2003b and 2006b as well as the QLFS 2009Q4, 2012Q4 
and 2014Q4 data.  
Note: question on firm size has only been asked since LFS 2000. 
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The SMME entrepreneurs cited various constraints to SMME growth (Lewis, 2001): some 
SMMEs believe that the demand for their products is low and they are not visible enough. 
They need a larger customer base to increase employment. The relatively small customer base 
is due to their financial constraints. The survey also revealed that SMMEs have limited access 
to capital and they pay high interests on personal loans because South African banks are very 
strict in lending capital. Another constraint that they highlighted was insufficient government 
contacts and support programs (Lewis, 2001). 
 
Some SMMEs believe that they can become competitive if government award them tenders 
and in that way they should be able to create more employment for the unskilled. SMMEs’ 
involvement in international trade is low compared to other countries. This is a major growth 
strategy that needs to be addressed though. What is of great concern is that 15% of the 
SMMEs said that they do not want to expand. This could limit growth and employment 
creation (Lewis, 2001). 
 
In addition, the owners of some SMMEs are of the opinion that there should be policy 
stability from government’s side, lower interest rate and education and training (Lewis, 2001). 
If these issues are addressed, according to them, they should be more competitive and able to 
create more employment. Lewis (2001) is of the opinion that if existing SMME firms have a 
longer lifespan and are able to expand and new firms mushroom with high turnover, existing 
firms should be able to create more employment.    
 
The previous discussions in Section 2.3.2 (Insider-outsider theory as well as Calmfors-Driffill 
model) already suggested that the labour-intensive, small firms are put at a disadvantaged 
position under the current collective bargaining structure. To make things worse, there are 
indications that the government policies favour towards the development of large enterprises, 
but do not provide sufficient support to promote the SMMEs as well as informal businesses 
(Lewis, 2001).  
 
With job creation such a major problem, the South African government is sitting with a major 
problem in doing business. In Figure 5.2, it can be seen how difficult it is to do business in 
South Africa. The restrictive labor regulations in South Africa ranks high and this makes 
foreign direct investment difficult and even for existing business to remain afloat. Another 
factor that is disturbing is the high amount of inadequately educated workforce. For forms to 
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excel, the workers have to be hands on at all times. With an inadequately workforce it is 
difficult for firm to grow at a fast rate. With slow growth it is difficult to create jobs. 
 
Figure 5.2: The most problematic factors for doing business in South Africa 
 
Source: 2014 World Economic Forum (2014: 340) 
 
Looking at South Africa’s global ranking on each labour market efficiency indicator (see 
Table 5.1), South Africa is ranked last in the category of cooperation in labour-employer 
relations. Even in the categories of hiring and firing practices, flexibility of wage 
determination and pay and productivity, South Africa is ranked dismally at the bottom. With 
such disappointing performance in the area of labour market efficiency, this would have 
serious negative implications on the country’s pace of employment creation.  
 
Table 5.1: South Africa’s global ranking on each labour market efficiency indicator 
Indicator Value (10) Rank (144) 
Cooperation in labour-employer relations 2.5 144 
Flexibility of wage determination 2.7 139 
Hiring and firing practices 2.1 143 
Redundancy costs, weeks of salary 9.3 33 
Effect of taxation on incentives to work 4.5 15 
Pay and productivity 2.7 136 
Reliance on professional management 5.5 21 
Country capacity to retain talent 3.7 50 
Country capacity to attract talent 3.9 39 
Source: World Economic Forum (2014: 341) 
 
The labour market rigidities such as the high cost of labour and capital intensive as discussed 
in Chapter 2 are problematic. Unless the various rigidities are addressed, the policies to 
support SMMEs are doomed to fail. Furthermore, in Figure 5.3, it can be seen that although 
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there is a positive correlation between real wage growth and labour productivity for South 
Africa, the extent of such positive relationship is weaker compared to most other countries. At 
this rate it is difficult for South Africa to increase job creation, as it is highly possible that the 
extent of real wage growth is much more rapid than that of labour productivity growth (refer 
to Figure 2.5b), and this would have negative impact on job creation in the country. 
 
Figure 5.3: Correlation between the real wage growth and labour productivity growth in selected 
economies 
 
Source: Klein (2012: 16) 
 
5.2.2 Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP) 
The Expanded Public Works programme (EPWP) was established to provide social protection 
to the working-age poor (Hall and Woolard, 2014). According to Phillips (2004) and the 
Department of Public Works, the EPWP was established to attract the unemployed to 
productive work. The EPWP was launched in 2004 and aims to provide employment for the 
unemployed, helping the unemployed through skills development and work experience, help 
the unemployed through starting small business (Bokolo, 2013). 
 
The EPWP jobs focus is on the building of infrastructure such as road building, public 
environment projects such as the removal of alien vegetation, public social programmes such 
as early childhood development and the economic sector which focusses on the development 
of small businesses and cooperatives (Hall and Woolard, 2014 and Musekene, 2015). Another 
programme under the EPWP is the Community Works Programme (CWP) which provides 
jobs for two days per week to the unemployed in selected areas. According to Hall and 
Woolard (2014), this kind of job allocation is decided by the specific community.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
The EPWP was not only established to provide temporary employment, but also to improve 
skills development (Bokolo, 2013). EPWP focusses on skill development. According to 
Bokolo (2013) the training provided was not for a long time, so these jobs were not 
sustainable. The training provided were mostly provided for the unskilled workers to upgrade 
their skills level, with the training mostly provided in construction, electricity and water 
supply.  
 
The proposed target of the EPWP was to create one million jobs from 2004 to 2009 in the first 
phase and 4.9 million jobs in the second phase from 2009 to 2014. The targets were not 
reached if we look at the employment figures. One of the reasons for this is because these 
programmes are temporary (Bokolo, 2013).  
 
In Table 5.2, it is evident that the EPWP does create some job opportunities across the 
different provinces in South Africa. The Eastern Cape province benefits the most from EPWP 
whilst Limpopo is the worst performer. The rich province of Gauteng is not doing well in the 
promotion and support of SMMEs as can be seen in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Work opportunities created by EPWP in 2007-2008  
Province EPWP Work  
Opportunities 
Number of  
Unemployed 
EPWP work opportunities 
as % of unemployed 
Kwazulu-Natal 109 273 938 000 12% 
Western Cape 49 584 368 000 13% 
Gauteng  67 363 926 000 7% 
Eastern Cape  83 281 449 000 18% 
Mpumalanga 26 245 292 000 9% 
Free State 24 745 267 000 9% 
Limpopo 20 133 331 000 6% 
North West 25 241 270 000 9% 
Northern Cape  16 549 105 000 16% 
Total 440 246 3 945 000 11% 
Source: Lieuw-Kie-Song (2009) 
 
According to Bokolo (2013), the skills received were not sufficient enough for proper skilled 
jobs, however the supply of semi-skilled jobs increased. Other reasons why the EPWP did not 
have the desired effect, according to Nattrass (2002), are the budget for EPWP is low when 
compared to the budgets allocated for social welfare, security and institutional constraints 
relating to the conceptualisation and design of programmes and insufficient project 
management capacity. 
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In order for the EPWP to be successful, Bokolo (2013) recommended that both public and 
private enterprises should drive EPWP programmes. This will ensure that the training for the 
unemployed will be in line with the current labour demand for the skilled workers. Bokolo 
(2013) also recommended that schools should become skill institutions and that EPWP 
projects should be effectively monitored and evaluated. Other recommendations from Bokolo 
(2013) include that women should be skilled in the formal sector and that programme 
managers must understand the recruitment process. 
 
5.2.3 Youth wage subsidy 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 clearly proves that youth unemployment is a very serious 
problem. While the EPWP may be more suitable to more elderly people with a little bit of 
work experience (but need to have their skills upgraded before they could find work in the 
labour market again), the youths’ situation is different, as they struggle to find their first job. 
 
In light of the high unemployment rate amongst the youth in South Africa, the government 
introduced the Employment Tax Incentives Bill or Youth Wage Subsidy on 1 January 2014 
which was preceded by numerous controversial debates amongst the different interest groups 
(Magwaza, 2014). According to Magwaza (2014) it was the priority of the election year that 
overshadowed the organisation’s arguments such as COSATU to avoid this policy 
implementation.  
 
Treasury announced, in its medium term budget in 2014, that 209 000 young workers were 
already employed in 23 500 firms (Magwaza, 2014). It is not known if these jobs would have 
been created irrespective of the subsidy or not. Another factor is that it is not clear if these 
jobs were created at the expense of others. It seems that the youth wage subsidy did create 
employment by just looking at the figures released by Treasury. However it is still early days 
to make a thorough analysis. 
 
Yu (2012) explains how the subsidy works: Only Pay as You Earn (PAYE) registered 
businesses will be eligible for the youth wage subsidy and it will only be given to full time 
workers who work no less than 35 hours per week. Only new workers between the ages of 18 
and 29 and existing workers between the ages of 18 and 29 who earn less than R60 000 per 
annum will qualify for the subsidy. The subsidy amount to R24 000 per worker per annum for 
a maximum of two years for new workers and one year for existing workers. The subsidy is 
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run through SARS where employers will have one of three options to collect the subsidy in 
which case they can either pay the net balance of PAYE tax and subsidy every six months. 
They also have the option of paying the net balance of PAYE tax and subsidy on a monthly 
basis and reconcile every six months or SARS can collect PAYE tax as usual and allows for a 
tax credit or rebate to the value of the subsidy. 
 
A youth wage subsidy is associated with certain pros and cons: National Treasury (2011) 
argues that the financial costs are reduced since employers do not know the people they are 
employing. The youth wage subsidy could reduce the training costs of young people and 
make it affordable to small employers. Because of the youth wage subsidy, young active work 
seekers and even the discouraged work seekers will now be more willing to look for work. 
 
However the arguments against the subsidy: according to National Treasury (2011) are the 
“deadweight loss” which is a situation where the subsidy is paid to employers who would 
have been hired anyway. Also, firms can replace unsubsidised (adult) workers with subsidised 
(youth) workers and by so doing getting rid of the unsubsidised workers. There is also the 
case of the displacement effect where the firms with subsidised employees outgrow those 
with unsubsidised workers. Then there is also the case of “destructive churning” where young 
workers are fired after the period of the subsidy. And also the “stigmatise effect” where 
subsidised workers are stigmatised by unsubsidised workers. 
 
While it may be too soon to evaluate whether the subsidy is successful in South Africa, the 
international experiences suggest that it is a success policy to boost youth employment. 
Ranchhod and Finn (2014) point out that the youth wage subsidy is successful in Europe 
where employment increases have been experienced in especially Poland (12%) and the 
Czech Republic (13%). In Latin American countries, the wage subsidy policies in the 1990s 
resulted in an average 4% increase in employment in countries such as Chile where the 
Chilean government introduced the Chile Joven subsidy when they trained 100 000 youths in 
1991. The youth also received a transport subsidy (Inter-Regional Inequality Facility, 2006). 
This resulted in an increase of 26 percent increase in employment (Smith, 2006). 
 
Looking at other countries that have implemented this subsidy, the Argentine government 
introduced a youth training subsidy called the Proyecto Joven in 1997 (Marshall, 1997) where 
young people between 15 and 24 were trained for six months at the firm provided they keep 
these youth for another six months. This programme was unsuccessful because there were 
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substantial retrenchments taking place during the training process. In contrast, in The United 
Kingdom, the government gave a subsidy of £60 a week for 24 weeks of training for the 
youth between 18 and 24. The employer received a subsidy of £750 for hiring a young 
worker. This resulted in 11 percent increase in youth employment (Smith, 2006). 
 
They also found that the youth wage subsidy works better in countries with flexible labour 
markets and the context of the youth wage subsidy determines the success of it. Smith (2006) 
on the other hand is of the opinion that supply side subsidies are cost administrative and that 
had affected employment creation in negatively in Australia for instance. Whereas the supply 
side programmes were successful in countries such as the USA, Canada and the UK. 
 
Puerto (2007) has done research in Latin American countries, whose economic profiles are 
similar to South Africa’s (Ranchhod and Finn, 2014). Puerto (2007) found that demand side 
subsidy programmes were more successful in countries such as Venezuela, Paraguay, Peru, 
Columbia, Panama and the Dominican Republic. But Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2006) found 
that the demand side programme of the Proempleo Experiment in Argentina led to an increase 
in unemployment. South Africa can learn a lot from the success in the Latin American 
countries. 
 
During the first year of the existence of the youth wage subsidy 270 000 youth workers were 
trained by 29000 firms across the country (Ranchhold and Finn, 2015). After their research of 
the evidence of the impact of a youth wage subsidy in other countries, Ranchhod and Finn 
(2014 & 2015) concluded that financing determine the success of a youth wage subsidy. 
Ranchhod and Finn (2014 & 2015) ran regressions on the empirical evidence of the youth 
wage subsidy in South Africa in their 2014 and 2015 studies. They adopted an economic 
approach called the difference-in-differences equation, to investigate if youth employment 
increased significantly since the implementation of the subsidy in 2014. The empirical 
findings do not indicate that youth employment increased significantly. This implies that the 
Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) has no substantial positive effect on aggressive youth 
employment probabilities in the short run. 
 
Nonetheless, given the short duration of the implementation of the subsidy (only 2 years at the 
time of this study), it may be too early to evaluate whether the subsidy is a success or not, but 
from the country experience, it seems the subsidy could be a promising policy to address the 
chronic youth employment option. 
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5.2.4 Training Layoff Scheme (TLS) 
The Training Layoff Scheme which was introduced by the CCMA was South Africa’s 
response to the global Financial crisis during late 2008 (Roskam and Howard, 2010). The 
TLS provides a temporary suspension of work for workers who face resignation. They train 
workers to acquire skills to acquire employment once they exit the training programme. The 
workers retain their contracts while in training. Workers are being trained for a short period of 
time and they are remunerated 75% of their wages during training (Department of Labour, 
2012). This is funded by Skills Education Training Authority and National Skills Fund. The 
purpose, according to Roskam and Howard (2010), was to train workers to become more 
productive and competitive.  
 
After the recession the economy revived and the workers are rehired. Those workers are then 
more skilled and more productive after the training and the firm gets more returns from those 
workers (Department of Labour, 2012).The employers save on wages and workers can 
compete for better job opportunities. This is a necessary tool to address the unemployment 
problem in South Africa.  
 
In Table 5.3, it can be seen that the CCMA have saved 3 773 jobs in 2011/2012 and 4725 jobs 
in 2012/2013. It is interesting to note that although the most jobs were saved in wholesale and 
retail, the jobs saved for mining and quarrying increased quite drastically in 2012/2013. The 
estimated number of jobs saved is 0.04% for the formal sector employment in 20111/2012 
which increased to 0.05% in 2012/2013.  
 
Table 5.3: Number of jobs saved by the CCMA’s TLS, 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 
Sector 
[A]: 
Number of 
jobs saved 
[B]: 
Formal sector 
Employment 
[A]/[B] 
(%) 
2011/2012 
[A]: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing 784 538 060 0.146 
[B]: Mining & Quarrying 207 334 098 0.062 
[C]: Manufacturing 893 1 483 491 0.060 
[D]: Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 0 89 626 0.000 
[E]: Construction 20 578 126 0.003 
[F]: Wholesale & Retail 1 512 1 890 802 0.080 
[G]: Transport, Storage & Communication 73 530 004 0.014 
[H]: Financial Intermediation 0 1 472 732 0.000 
[I]: Community, Social & Personal Services 284 2 547 430 0.011 
[J]: Other 0 7 018 0.000 
Total 3 773 9 471 387 0.040 
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
Sector 
[A]: 
Number of 
jobs saved 
[B]: 
Formal sector 
Employment 
[A]/[B] 
(%) 
2012/2013 
[A]: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing 40 622 790 0.006 
[B]: Mining & Quarrying 1 549 364 479 0.425 
[C]: Manufacturing 1 365 1 477 614 0.092 
[D]: Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 0 113 879 0.000 
[E]: Construction 49 644 161 0.008 
[F]: Wholesale & Retail 1 567 1 719 921 0.091 
[G]: Transport, Storage & Communication 65 548 166 0.012 
[H]: Financial Intermediation 0 1 481 094 0.000 
[I]: Community, Social & Personal Services 90 2 611 939 0.003 
[J]: Other 0 2 013 0.000 
Total 4 725 9 586 056 0.049 
Source: Bhorat (2014: 9-10) 
 
The concerns about the TLS were that it was only promoted in economic rich provinces.  
According to Themba (2014) some of the employers in rural areas were not even aware that 
TLS exist. And those who knew were so discouraged to make use of the services of the 
CCMA because they have to travel long distances to the offices of the CCMA. The training 
provided by the CCMA is far from the employees in remote rural areas (Themba, 2014). 
 
5.2.5 Improving the quality of education 
The Bantu Education Act of 1953 required that Bantu Education be funded by the taxes of 
Africans (Bromberger, 1982). This had the effect that the expenditure on Black education fell 
in per capita terms from 13% in 1953 to 10% in 1961 (Van der Berg and Bhorat, 1999). The 
National Party’s expenditure on education for blacks was the least among the four racial 
groups. 
 
Under the apartheid regime, the education system was categorised racially into four different 
departments (De Vos, 2011). The Department of Education and Training (DET) was for 
Black children, House of Assembly (HOA) for White children, House of Delegates (HOD) 
for Indian children and House of Representatives (HOR) for Coloured children. The 
performances of the different departments in Mathematics and English were different for the 
different racial groups because resources were skewly biased towards White children as can 
be seen in this Box plot. It is clear that the White children’s performance is much better in 
Mathematics and English. 
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Although the South African government spend the biggest amount of the national budget on 
education, South African children still perform poor in international competency tests even 
with countries with poor education systems (Shepherd, 2011). South Africa was ranked last in 
the 2003 Trends in Mathematical and Science Studies (TIMSS) tests in Grade 8 of 50 
countries for Mathematics Grade Four and Eight. In the Figure A.1 in the Appendix, it can be 
seen that South Africa was last in the Mathematical Competency Test. Most top jobs that 
require skilled employment require Mathematics as a pre requisite for studying. With these 
dismal results in Mathematics, that sector of employment will still have a shortage or rely on 
immigrant labour meaning that the progress to solve the unemployment crisis will be slow. 
 
Looking at Figure A.2, it can also be seen that South Africa was ranked a disappointing last 
position in the Science Competency Test for Grade Four and Eight in the 2003 TIMSS. 
Science is the building block of technology and for growing economy like South Africa it is 
important that the country must produce many scientists. Science is also important for the 
construction sector. With more skilled engineers, the unemployment problem in construction 
for unskilled and semi-skilled workers can be addressed faster.  However with test scores 
such as this, the road to economic success for South Africa is much longer.  
 
As far as the Reading Scores for Grade Four and Eight in the 2006 Progress in International 
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) are concerned, South Africa was once again ranked last. It is 
clear that the South African education system is failing the economy. With these low scores in 
Reading it is difficult to produce skilled labour which the country need.  
 
Barker (2007) found that only 13% of the pupils who are doing Mathematics and Science in 
Matric, are black learners. Another worrying factor is that only a small the learners who enrol 
for teacher qualifications in tertiary institutions, study Mathematics and Science and that is 
not sufficient to replace the teachers who resign or retire (Barker, 2007).  
 
The South African economy needs Mathematics and Science graduates to address the skills 
backlog. Some ways to address the educational backlog especially in Mathematics and 
Science are: to increase the school year, reduce the absentee rate of both learners and teachers, 
devote more time to Mathematics and Science, spend more time on repetition and homework 
(CDE, 2005a). The ineffectiveness stems from the bad performances of historically black 
schools (Van der Berg, Wood and Roux, 2002:305). The Southern and Eastern Africa 
Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) report of the reading tests in 
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2000 showed that South Africa’s children performance in historically black schools were 
dismal (Van der Berg, 2006:5).   
 
On tertiary level, the proportion for engineering qualifications engineering and technology 
qualifications decreased from 8% in 1992 to 5% in 2003 (Barker, 2007). This does not spell a 
good future for science and engineering. The National Plan for Higher Education intend to 
shift the enrolment towards engineering and science within the next five to ten years (Siskins, 
2002) 
 
South Africa export raw material and import finished products. If South Africa wants to 
manufacture its own raw materials, they need to improve the Science component of the 
education system. The more scientist a country produce, the better the possibility for new 
technological innovation and manufacturing. 
 
Van der Berg (2007) found that only 44% of the Blacks starting school complete Matric 
compared to 97% Whites. This results in most young Blacks leaving schools to join the work 
seeking unemployed. What is more of a concern is that only 25% of the matriculants find 
employment leaving the other 75% joining the unemployed (Van der Berg, 2007). 
 
The South African government is aware that the unemployment problem can only be 
addressed if more skilled workers enter the labour market. For this reason the government is 
trying to improve the quality of education (Van der Berg, 2007). First, the South African 
government pumped lots of money in education to address the backlogs in education. The 
number of schools without running water, reduced dramatically from 1996 as well as the 
number of overcrowded classes (Department of Basic Education, 2011b: 152). The South 
African government is also addressing the shortage of school equipment in especially 
disadvantaged schools. This is critical because learners with better equipment perform better 
according to Bhorat and Oosthuisen (2008). The South African government is also attempting 
to reduce class sizes because some studies have shown that large class sizes tend to make 
education dysfunctional (Crouch and Mabogoane, 2001; Simkins and Paterson, 2004; Van der 
Berg, 2006; De Lannoy and Hall, 2012). The South African government also try to distribute 
school resources more equally amongst the different schools. 
 
The South African government is trying to improve the management style of leaders, in 
particular principals, on a national and local level because evidence show that strong 
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principals achieve good results. According to Van der Berg (2010), the highly skilled South 
African teachers are worse off than highly skilled South Africans. The South African 
government is trying to align teachers’ salaries with those in the private sector with more or 
less similar qualifications. The South African government is constantly trying to change the 
school curriculum to meet the education needs of disadvantage learners. 
 
The South African Council of Educators (SACE) ensures that teachers undergo a certain 
degree of training over several years. At the moment, the South African government supply 
most teachers with laptops to assist them in distance education and training. Vocational 
Education and Training is encouraged among drop out learners and those with poor matric 
results. To address the unemployment problem, young people are encouraged to join Further 
Education and Training Colleges (FET) and through the SETAs as well (OECD Economic 
Survey, 2013).   
 
Enrolment at universities is hampered by limited access to credit. The results of the research 
conducted by Gurgand et al. (2012) show that enrolment at universities and access to credit at 
private institutions and banks are positively related. The South African government assist 
poor students through a national students fund (NSFAS) which is a loan which has to be paid 
back with small interests (OECD Economic Survey, 2013).   
 
To conclude, as Table 4.2 shows that the employed have become more educated over the 
years, this implies rapid structural change is taking place in the economy (highly skilled, 
highly educated people are demanded) since the economic transition. So, it means 
government must continue to improve the educational quality (in particular addressing the 
huge variance in students’ performance by race, mainly due to the impact of the 
discriminatory educational policies during apartheid), in order to improve the employment 
prospects of non-whites in the labour market.  
 
5.3  Feasibility of alternative policy options  
 
5.3.1 Transport subsidy 
An analysis made by Bhorat (2012) found that many people travel long distances to and from 
the cities. Most blacks live far from the cities and in the rural poor areas. The unemployed is 
concentrated around the young black people. According to Bhorat (2012) it is expensive for 
the unemployed to travel to the places where the jobs are concentrated. African males spend 
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more time on average than white males to travel to work (Bhorat, 2012). The lack of cash for 
job searching can create frictions in the labour market (Card et.al. 2007 and Bryan et.al. 
2014). This can be seen in the table below that was researched by Bhorat (2012). Figure 5.4 
shows that unskilled and semi-skilled workers spend a significant amount of their income on 
transport. 
 
Figure 5.4: Mean Transport Cost, Percentage of Household Income and Salary, by Skill Level 
 
Source: Bhorat (2012: 8), using data from the 1995 Income and Expenditure Survey 
 
Bhorat (2012) found that the unskilled employed spend 3.8% of their household income on 
traveling to and from work which also result in 5.5% of their wage income. He also revealed 
that most of the discouraged work seekers are living in areas with the lowest job density. 
They are in outlying rural areas where there is poor network and they lack the skills to access 
employment opportunities. It is thus extremely costly for these people to look for work.  
 
Bhorat (2012) suggests that government must provide a transport subsidy for the unemployed 
to look for jobs. The subsidy can be provided in different ways. It can take on the form where 
the young unemployed could go to the centres of the Department of Labour and access 
information on job search. The size of the subsidy will be determined by the costs of 
travelling to and from places of high density jobs. The subsidy can take on different form. It 
can also be used to create self-employment opportunities. Bhorat (2012) further suggests that 
the subsidy should not be a once off, but should be continuous for about five months since it 
is also a learning process for job searching methods. However, the government must be 
careful that the transport subsidy is not abused. The subsidy could increase non-labour 
income, so people may prefer leisure over work. This can easily end up discouraging labour 
supply (Bhorat, 2012). 
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Transport subsidy has not been considered as feasible policy option in Africa to boost 
employment. An exception is Ethiopia, as the information for job searching is mostly found in 
the city centre of Addis Ababa and it is expensive for job seekers from the rural areas to travel 
there (Franklin, 2015). After testing the impact of a transport subsidy, Franklin (2015) found 
that a transport subsidy had a positive impact on the labour market in Ethiopia. Job seekers 
were able to find the most wanted and especially scarce jobs faster than they would have been 
with no transport subsidy.  
 
5.3.2 Job search subsidy 
Another way of reducing unemployment is by subsidising the cost involved in job searching 
processes. Evans-Klock et al. (1998) explain the job search assistance delivered through the 
Public Employment Service (PES), as measures to help displaced workers in their job search 
processes in order to enhance the flow of information between employers and work seekers. 
The PES must be well managed in order for this programme to be successful so that they can 
be effective in times of employment crises (Evans-Klock et al., 1998). The aim of this policy, 
according to Evans-Klock et al. (1998), is to avoid long-term unemployment by identifying 
the risks soon enough and engage workers in counselling programmes. This policy, according 
to Evans-Klock et al. (1998), works well in Western Europe where it is characterised by low 
costs and high pay-offs.  
 
Rankin (2013) believes that job seeker should truly spend the subsidy looking for jobs. It is 
believed that an inflow of income in terms of government subsidy can encourage unemployed 
people to look for jobs or move to an area where they can find jobs (Hosegood, et al., 2009 
and Posel et al., 2006). Job search can be monitored according to Rankin (2013) like in other 
countries where job seekers have to provide proof of application letters, proof of registration 
with agencies and proof of participation in selection procedures. Firms must recruit through 
the channels that the subsidising job seekers will be using. 
 
After his research in Ethiopia, Franklin (2015) found that the job search subsidy helped work 
seekers to find jobs. However these jobs were temporary jobs. But the problem is not the type 
of job but if the job search subsidy is successful in finding job seekers a job. In the case of 
Ethiopia, the subsidy was successful.  
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Job search subsidy is a good new policy option. However, government must be cautious as 
the receipt of the subsidy means increase of non-labour income to the recipient (Franklin, 
2015). This means that it can have a negative effect on labour supply (i.e. leisure preferred 
over work). Hence, Franklin (2015) is of the opinion that the government must ensure that the 
subsidy is really used productively to seek work. 
 
5.3.3 Stipend paid for volunteers 
After 1994 the national government used volunteers to meet people’s needs (Hunter and Ross, 
2013). These volunteers who are concentrated on the unemployed youth, take part in 
programmes that address social welfare issues in different communities. For the efforts of the 
volunteers they are paid a stipend. In this case employment is created. The stipend that is paid 
to the volunteers is far below the fair market value do formal work in communities which they 
have no connection with (Tschiarhart et.al. 2001:422). 
 
Many stipend paid volunteers were concentrated in the EPWP programmes where they 
provided a service and also increase their skills during the program. By the time they exit the 
programme they should have acquired enough skills to find a semi-skilled or fully skilled job 
(Plaatjies and Nicolaou-Manias, 2005). Many other NPOs make use of stipend paid 
volunteers. Since unemployment is so high and it is difficult to find a job, this volunteerism is 
a way out for many unemployed youth and they become valuable in the different 
communities.  
 
Akintola (2011) argues that the stipend paid volunteers in the EPWP is a cheap way out. The 
stipend is, according to Plushnews (2005), a wage subsidy which is equal to a wage needed to 
attract a work seeker. Plushnews (2005) is of the opinion that the stipend paid volunteers are 
similar to the efficiency wage theory where workers are more productive and reach out to 
those who do not share the same perceptions as the activity. Stipend paid workers, according 
to Akintola (2011), are more motivated to acquire skills than low paid workers because these 
stipend paid volunteers must fulfil certain functions for government.  
 
Stipend-paid volunteerism does alleviate poverty (Schenck and Louw, 2010). However 
Biyase and Bromberger (2005) believe that stipend-paid volunteerism is a way of “churning” 
unemployment and is not a long term solution. But the skills that the volunteers gain can get 
them permanent jobs. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
There are many ways to reduce unemployment. Each case as discussed above has merits. The 
way the problem is addressed differs from country to country. There is no exact way to 
address the unemployment problem. It is a combination of different strategies that may work. 
Some economists believe that economic growth will lead automatically to reduce 
unemployment, but that did not happen in South Africa. When that did not happen, it was 
called jobless growth. In order for South Africa to address the unemployment problem, all the 
stake holders such as the corporate world, education, NGOs and more should sit together to 
find a solution. 
 
Table 5.4: Brief summary of various labour market policies 
Policy Primary Tool 
Promotion of 
SMMEs 
To  promote the development and growth of (labour-intensive) 
SMMES, and subsequently boost job creation from these 
enterprises 
EPWP To improve the skills of elderly people with some previous work 
experience but their current skills may be obsolete, not demanded 
by employers anymore 
ETIB To increase employment of the youth jobseekers, especially those 
who struggle to find their first job 
TLS To prevent mass retrenchment, a case of economic recession and 
low economic profits, via intervention mechanisms by the CCMA 
Improvement of 
quality of education 
To increase employment prospects of job seekers and to better 
match the skills supplied by jobseekers and skills demanded by 
employers 
Transport subsidy To mainly assist the poor unemployed 
Job search subsidy To mainly assist the poor unemployed 
Stipend To promote temporary work experience of job seekers 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study aimed at critically evaluating the possible policy options to reduce unemployment 
in South Africa. The data from Stats SA and other sources shows unemployment is 
concentrated on the Black youth. The South African government has many policy options to 
their exposal. There is not one best policy. Past experiences and lessons from other countries 
give guidance as to what policies to engage in.   
 
6.2  Review of findings 
  
Chapter Two provided a review of conceptual, theoretical and legislative framework. The 
active and passive labour market policies were discussed. The different labour market 
legislations that affect the study were also discussed in the chapter. The purpose of these 
legislations is to see to what extent the study is allowed to make recommendations. The main 
causes of unemployment were discussed to see the origin of the unemployment crisis. 
 
After discussing the data and methodology in Chapter Three, the study moved on by 
examining the labour market trends of the country in Chapter 4. The main findings were as 
follows: although employment increased, it was not rapid enough to absorb the net labour 
force entrants, thereby causing the employment absorption rate to be only 67% between 1995 
and 2014; the ASGISA goal of reducing unemployment rate to 15% by the end of 2014 was 
not achieved (approximately one quarter of the labour force remained unemployed); youths, 
Blacks, and those without Matric were associated with the greatest likelihood of being 
unemployed; a lot of labour force entrants have been struggling to find their first job; the 
number of employees who reported working for firms with fewer than 10 workers were 
stagnant at about 3 million. 
 
Chapter Five discusses the main labour market policies to boost unemployment. Some of the 
policies are already in place while other policies are still under discussion. The youth wage 
subsidy was implemented mainly for the youth without any job experience. The EPWP helps 
the elderly with some experience but outdated skills. Non-whites in general were affected by 
past inequalities, more specific educational inequalities. The South African government try to 
reverse this by implementing some types of legislation.  
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SMMEs who are supposed to create most of the employment are not working because of the 
rigidities that were discusses in Chapter 2. The Training Layoff Scheme could prevent large 
scale of retrenchment during the recession. Other alternative policies are not implemented yet 
(e.g. transport subsidy, job search subsidy), but the government should consider them as 
possible labour market policies to boost employment in future. 
 
6.3  Conclusion 
 
This study examined the labour market trends as well as evaluated various labour market 
policies to create jobs more rapidly in South Africa; these policies target at various groups of 
unemployed in the labour force, namely youths (Employment Tax Incentives Bill), more 
elderly people with some prior work experience, but need their skills upgraded to some extent 
before they could find semi-skilled jobs (Expanded Public Works Program), poor people 
(transport subsidy, job search subsidy), workers who could be retrenched in SMMEs 
(Training Layoff Scheme), etc.  
 
Nonetheless, unless the root causes of unemployment are seriously addressed by the 
government (i.e. skills mismatch, employment discrimination, barriers of entry to informal 
sector, insufficient to promote the development and growth of SMMEs, wage rigidity, 
employment rigidity, lack of linkage between real wage growth and labour productivity 
growth, etc.), the effectiveness of the various labour market policies could be seriously 
hindered by these factors. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Labour market aggregates under the narrow definition, 1995-2014 
 
Employed Unemployed LF 15-65 years LFPR Unemployment rate 
OHS1995 9 499 347 2 028 242 11 527 589 24 190 583 47.7% 17.6% 
OHS1996 8 966 307 2 224 292 11 190 599 24 909 065 44.9% 19.9% 
OHS1997 9 093 647 2 450 738 11 544 385 25 505 157 45.3% 21.2% 
OHS1998 9 370 130 3 157 950 12 528 080 25 665 233 48.8% 25.2% 
OHS1999 10 356 143 3 153 783 13 509 926 26 246 545 51.5% 23.3% 
LFS2000a 11 874 409 4 331 234 16 205 643 26 442 663 61.3% 26.7% 
LFS2000b 12 224 406 4 156 910 16 381 316 27 774 168 59.0% 25.4% 
LFS2001a 12 260 207 4 407 860 16 668 067 28 062 004 59.4% 26.4% 
LFS2001b 11 167 541 4 649 836 15 817 377 28 083 997 56.3% 29.4% 
LFS2002a 11 603 398 4 890 933 16 494 331 28 298 255 58.3% 29.7% 
LFS2002b 11 283 924 4 930 670 16 214 594 28 495 088 56.9% 30.4% 
LFS2003a 11 297 621 5 111 408 16 409 029 28 724 521 57.1% 31.1% 
LFS2003b 11 411 351 4 429 336 15 840 687 28 906 230 54.8% 28.0% 
LFS2004a 11 378 217 4 409 532 15 787 749 29 099 787 54.3% 27.9% 
LFS2004b 11 630 196 4 130 884 15 761 080 29 270 403 53.8% 26.2% 
LFS2005a 11 894 320 4 278 200 16 172 520 29 489 763 54.8% 26.5% 
LFS2005b 12 287 798 4 482 363 16 770 161 29 663 379 56.5% 26.7% 
LFS2006a 12 437 963 4 269 990 16 707 953 29 817 824 56.0% 25.6% 
LFS2006b 12 787 285 4 386 117 17 173 402 29 972 571 57.3% 25.5% 
LFS2007a 12 634 896 4 330 958 16 965 854 30 160 997 56.3% 25.5% 
LFS2007b 13 293 327 3 900 871 17 194 198 30 387 402 56.6% 22.7% 
QLFS2008Q1 14 450 646 4 368 431 18 819 077 31 700 031 59.4% 23.2% 
QLFS2008Q2 14 604 053 4 267 398 18 871 451 31 859 272 59.2% 22.6% 
QLFS2008Q3 14 561 398 4 297 826 18 859 224 31 987 108 59.0% 22.8% 
QLFS2008Q4 14 784 916 4 045 894 18 830 810 32 141 290 58.6% 21.5% 
QLFS2009Q1 14 631 692 4 363 098 18 994 790 32 293 255 58.8% 23.0% 
QLFS2009Q2 14 374 908 4 338 482 18 713 390 32 452 436 57.7% 23.2% 
QLFS2009Q3 13 841 980 4 473 324 18 315 304 32 590 099 56.2% 24.4% 
QLFS2009Q4 13 982 850 4 426 049 18 408 899 32 733 898 56.2% 24.0% 
QLFS2010Q1 13 820 568 4 609 906 18 430 474 32 917 597 56.0% 25.0% 
QLFS2010Q2 13 834 144 4 618 653 18 452 797 33 062 618 55.8% 25.0% 
QLFS2010Q3 13 668 819 4 652 706 18 321 525 33 246 836 55.1% 25.4% 
QLFS2010Q4 13 915 884 4 365 474 18 281 358 33 365 615 54.8% 23.9% 
QLFS2011Q1 13 917 447 4 595 380 18 512 827 33 508 825 55.2% 24.8% 
QLFS2011Q2 13 933 454 4 778 567 18 712 021 33 672 970 55.6% 25.5% 
QLFS2011Q3 14 131 609 4 696 073 18 827 682 33 818 983 55.7% 24.9% 
QLFS2011Q4 14 349 931 4 464 040 18 813 971 33 974 114 55.4% 23.7% 
QLFS2012Q1 14 297 605 4 765 531 19 063 136 34 128 626 55.9% 25.0% 
QLFS2012Q2 14 348 370 4 717 459 19 065 829 34 301 187 55.6% 24.7% 
QLFS2012Q3 14 583 192 4 898 166 19 481 358 34 456 238 56.5% 25.1% 
QLFS2012Q4 14 541 707 4 708 069 19 249 776 34 616 851 55.6% 24.5% 
QLFS2013Q1 14 569 906 4 860 906 19 430 812 34 756 987 55.9% 25.0% 
QLFS2013Q2 14 706 731 4 970 511 19 677 242 34 908 625 56.4% 25.3% 
QLFS2013Q3 15 061 904 4 877 670 19 939 574 35 077 845 56.8% 24.5% 
QLFS2013Q4 15 195 491 4 827 260 20 022 751 35 231 309 56.8% 24.1% 
QLFS2014Q1 15 073 201 5 064 715 20 137 916 35 404 659 56.9% 25.2% 
QLFS2014Q2 15 111 626 5 150 552 20 262 178 35 549 472 57.0% 25.4% 
QLFS2014Q3 15 146 354 5 147 978 20 294 332 35 702 828 56.8% 25.4% 
QLFS2014Q4 15 352 782 4 905 277 20 258 059 35 869 820 56.5% 24.2% 
Source: Own calculations using 1995-1999 OHS, 2000-2007 LFS and 2008-2014 QLFS data. 
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Table A.2: Number of employed by industry, 1995-2014 
 
Primary Secondary Tertiary Not classified 
All 
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing 
Electricity 
& Water 
Construction 
Wholesale & 
Retail 
Transport Finance 
Personal 
services 
Private 
households 
Unspecified 
OHS1995 1 233 552 440 399 1 434 815 84 432 444 844 1 665 345 476 005 579 879 2 171 561 797 949 170 566 9 499 347 
OHS1996 758 215 249 872 1 383 762 126 268 421 716 1 373 131 479 535 747 425 2 014 528 804 667 607 188 8 966 307 
OHS1997 758 185 394 105 1 520 718 114 999 512 306 1 569 654 529 271 724 950 1 875 918 755 109 338 432 9 093 647 
OHS1998 934 070 434 272 1 381 207 112 641 546 417 1 782 514 551 168 853 151 1 843 845 769 365 161 480 9 370 130 
OHS1999 1 096 888 475 554 1 496 075 78 324 566 174 2 076 231 538 822 929 823 1 981 523 965 297 151 432 10 356 143 
LFS2000a 2 283 670 467 194 1 468 817 87 903 596 134 2 433 395 547 041 837 188 1 898 781 1 186 279 68 007 11 874 409 
LFS2000b 1 911 210 601 839 1 576 650 93 792 682 138 2 473 106 581 176 975 149 2 082 172 1 143 881 103 293 12 224 406 
LFS2001a 1 574 863 565 642 1 616 849 100 713 637 968 3 048 783 579 503 1 008 449 2 014 914 1 034 372 78 151 12 260 207 
LFS2001b 1 175 944 553 389 1 618 419 94 311 633 417 2 451 348 545 774 1 034 336 1 986 460 1 032 217 41 926 11 167 541 
LFS2002a 1 737 008 542 715 1 596 147 81 409 577 164 2 315 174 570 900 1 037 319 2 006 627 1 080 040 58 895 11 603 398 
LFS2002b 1 417 822 558 601 1 631 160 83 757 603 869 2 191 508 573 468 1 083 400 2 040 370 1 028 021 71 948 11 283 924 
LFS2003a 1 288 460 557 038 1 585 987 85 753 592 775 2 325 635 579 226 1 036 679 2 112 838 1 087 995 45 235 11 297 621 
LFS2003b 1 210 786 551 612 1 548 157 90 984 663 719 2 426 605 536 775 1 097 155 2 177 950 1 073 954 33 654 11 411 351 
LFS2004a 1 257 100 558 416 1 591 319 105 765 658 203 2 351 588 580 551 1 068 036 2 155 810 1 024 056 27 373 11 378 217 
LFS2004b 1 060 893 404 288 1 712 449 99 266 822 734 2 539 864 562 628 1 146 395 2 182 449 1 073 570 25 660 11 630 196 
LFS2005a 1 167 975 425 142 1 650 777 124 733 811 845 2 646 086 592 278 1 140 031 2 232 103 1 073 963 29 387 11 894 320 
LFS2005b 923 010 410 657 1 704 899 99 704 934 063 3 021 277 615 225 1 294 673 2 189 841 1 065 957 28 492 12 287 798 
LFS2006a 1 315 196 398 443 1 724 526 102 432 863 178 2 992 907 554 147 1 193 107 2 180 446 1 085 275 28 306 12 437 963 
LFS2006b 1 085 614 397 238 1 735 573 118 919 1 023 251 3 051 961 610 009 1 308 623 2 316 690 1 106 332 33 075 12 787 285 
LFS2007a 1 072 429 454 636 1 756 914 100 070 964 687 2 958 728 575 550 1 319 191 2 307 769 1 106 729 18 193 12 634 896 
LFS2007b 1 038 987 431 716 1 755 478 98 415 1 053 036 2 932 686 695 809 1 480 860 2 557 004 1 194 920 54 416 13 293 327 
QLFS2008Q1 842 290 352 452 2 111 008 102 699 1 181 821 3 323 013 807 798 1 779 117 2 716 170 1 234 278 0 14 450 646 
QLFS2008Q2 821 649 372 468 2 100 596 108 749 1 225 639 3 277 343 835 340 1 813 605 2 786 797 1 257 121 4 746 14 604 053 
QLFS2008Q3 809 705 339 530 2 056 384 107 409 1 184 458 3 342 428 823 356 1 769 858 2 775 830 1 348 845 3 595 14 561 398 
QLFS2008Q4 806 695 349 043 2 097 897 94 272 1 279 265 3 337 827 831 783 1 772 772 2 833 855 1 376 368 5 139 14 784 916 
QLFS2009Q1 778 951 361 086 2 032 078 112 329 1 221 890 3 208 574 821 269 1 866 126 2 831 049 1 393 306 5 034 14 631 692 
QLFS2009Q2 753 063 349 213 2 032 723 103 478 1 207 458 3 159 301 781 512 1 855 683 2 842 931 1 287 201 2 345 14 374 908 
QLFS2009Q3 682 523 325 831 1 868 899 93 268 1 153 257 3 038 375 797 641 1 827 390 2 792 579 1 255 181 7 036 13 841 980 
QLFS2009Q4 647 161 321 610 1 888 352 109 077 1 177 747 3 080 290 802 080 1 911 914 2 808 854 1 232 144 3 621 13 982 850 
QLFS2010Q1 683 752 324 121 1 852 468 78 123 1 106 559 3 024 868 838 976 1 784 348 2 848 469 1 272 107 6 777 13 820 568 
QLFS2010Q2 655 070 332 228 1 813 493 103 069 1 098 701 3 061 752 810 707 1 828 914 2 869 769 1 253 274 7 167 13 834 144 
QLFS2010Q3 674 524 328 657 1 820 218 101 818 1 116 981 3 092 421 812 424 1 693 824 2 810 322 1 216 336 1 294 13 668 819 
QLFS2010Q4 649 521 320 360 1 892 648 96 159 1 115 275 3 129 840 806 608 1 704 742 2 985 972 1 214 133 626 13 915 884 
QLFS2011Q1 628 087 335 071 1 907 826 99 613 1 094 594 3 122 634 777 237 1 740 706 2 990 710 1 215 173 5 796 13 917 447 
QLFS2011Q2 625 768 301 474 1 832 709 96 799 1 099 386 3 104 837 821 722 1 817 142 3 011 686 1 218 949 2 982 13 933 454 
QLFS2011Q3 653 204 346 300 1 839 480 81 092 1 137 332 3 171 987 807 711 1 873 738 3 011 764 1 205 165 3 836 14 131 609 
QLFS2011Q4 671 167 352 838 1 910 309 87 038 1 104 972 3 200 122 839 810 1 849 557 3 103 264 1 224 363 6 491 14 349 931 
QLFS2012Q1 693 910 362 277 1 836 818 95 521 1 042 119 3 212 003 833 451 1 857 839 3 095 992 1 260 774 6 901 14 297 605 
QLFS2012Q2 675 797 383 769 1 784 747 103 548 1 073 021 3 138 122 836 046 1 861 976 3 228 306 1 258 693 4 345 14 348 370 
QLFS2012Q3 700 029 374 511 1 836 452 107 812 1 117 265 3 132 224 895 088 1 947 057 3 241 830 1 230 036 888 14 583 192 
QLFS2012Q4 719 436 379 821 1 815 950 102 470 1 133 484 3 111 319 877 010 1 952 700 3 255 801 1 191 798 1 918 14 541 707 
QLFS2013Q1 765 073 393 369 1 859 408 124 130 1 085 525 3 031 862 871 441 1 916 376 3 298 680 1 221 452 2 590 14 569 906 
QLFS2013Q2 742 033 403 000 1 840 224 124 124 1 150 912 3 089 905 900 238 1 968 296 3 266 934 1 216 960 4 105 14 706 731 
QLFS2013Q3 741 345 422 237 1 781 067 139 609 1 146 237 3 196 077 929 052 2 062 405 3 375 515 1 265 543 2 817 15 061 904 
QLFS2013Q4 714 851 425 956 1 768 479 126 918 1 204 391 3 233 002 963 023 2 039 180 3 471 732 1 245 176 2 783 15 195 491 
QLFS2014Q1 709 821 423 881 1 806 667 129 510 1 199 513 3 192 830 896 164 2 048 406 3 430 245 1 232 715 3 449 15 073 201 
QLFS2014Q2 669 470 418 612 1 746 980 118 095 1 182 529 3 182 143 950 173 2 016 366 3 533 508 1 291 126 2 624 15 111 626 
QLFS2014Q3 685 828 440 760 1 743 328 118 302 1 282 368 3 200 818 932 882 2 037 485 3 518 813 1 182 755 3 015 15 146 354 
QLFS2014Q4 743 166 426 875 1 755 221 103 444 1 334 025 3 251 072 953 307 2 047 224 3 508 620 1 223 195 6 633 15 352 782 
Source: Own calculations using 1995-1999 OHS, 2000-2007 LFS and 2008-2014 QLFS data.
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Figure A.1: TIMSS 2003 student average Mathematical test score by participating country  
 
Source: Mullis et al. (2004) 
 
Figure A.2: TIMSS 2003 student average Science test score by participating country  
 
Source: Martin et al. (2004) 
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Figure A.3: PIRLS 2006 student average Reading test score by participating country  
 
Source: Mullis et al. (2007) 
 
 
 
 
